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531 
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE AS SUPER 
CONTRACT 
RICHARD FRANKEL

 
ABSTRACT 
It is widely acknowledged that the purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) was to place arbitration clauses on equal footing with other 
contracts. Nonetheless, federal and state courts have turned arbitration 
clauses into “super contracts” by creating special interpretive rules for 
arbitration clauses that do not apply to other contracts. In doing so, they 
have relied extensively, and incorrectly, on the Supreme Court’s 
determination that the FAA embodies a federal policy favoring 
arbitration.  
While many scholars have focused attention on the public policy 
rationales for and against arbitration, few have explored how arbitration 
clauses should be interpreted. This Article fills that gap and asserts that 
the judiciary’s inappropriate reliance on the federal policy favoring 
arbitration distorts state contract law to push cases into arbitration that 
do not belong there, thereby unfairly depriving litigants of access to the 
courts. By creating special rules that favor arbitration and that deviate 
from state contract law, courts are enforcing arbitration agreements in 
situations where they would not enforce other agreements. This Article 
challenges the judiciary’s favored treatment of arbitration clauses and 
identifies several areas in which arbitration clauses are being 
over-enforced as a result. The fact that courts send too many disputes into 
arbitration also is significant because it undermines the perception, 
common among both academics and judges, that courts remain hostile to 
arbitration rather than supportive of it.  
Because the original purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to 
make arbitration clauses just like other contracts, this Article proposes 
that courts should construe the federal policy favoring arbitration in a 
way that is consistent with state contract law rather than in a way that 
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uproots it. Doing so best ensures that litigants are not unfairly forced into 
arbitration where they never agreed to it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the issue of the enforceability of mandatory arbitration 
clauses is a controversial one, it should not be. The Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 with a simple goal: to overcome existing 
judicial unwillingness to enforce arbitration clauses by placing arbitration 
clauses on “equal footing” with other contracts.1 The Act made such 
clauses as enforceable as any other contract provision and subject to the 
same defenses as applied to other contracts.
2
 
Current interpretation of the FAA, however, places arbitration clauses 
not on equal footing, but on a pedestal. Courts have strayed from the 
 
 
 1. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) (“The FAA directs courts to place 
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts . . . .”); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (“[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to 
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”). 
 2. See 9 U.S.C § 2 (2012) (making arbitration clauses enforceable “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). Typical contract defenses may include 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, lack of consideration, and waiver. See generally E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/4
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FAA’s original purpose and have turned arbitration clauses into a type of 
“super contract.”3 Although courts purport to apply general contract law 
when interpreting arbitration clauses, they have in fact distorted contract 
law by creating special rules for arbitration clauses that make them 
enforceable in situations where other contracts are not. The consequence is 
that many litigants are improperly losing their right of access to the courts 
and are being forced to submit to arbitration.  
Much of this arbitration favoritism is attributable to lower-court 
misinterpretation of thirty-year-old dicta from the United States Supreme 
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corporation.
4
 In that case, the Court stated that the FAA embodies “a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and establishes that “any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration” notwithstanding any state policies to the contrary.5 
The Court’s creation of a federal policy favoring arbitration has been 
transformational. The use of arbitration clauses has exploded in the last 
thirty years,
6
 and such clauses are routinely inserted by corporations into 
employment agreements, consumer contracts, brokerage agreements, and 
the like.
7
 Since the Supreme Court first declared the federal policy 
 
 
 3. This Article is not the first to use the “super contract” phrase to describe arbitration clauses. 
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 34, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) 
(No. 04-1264) (characterizing a lower court as treating an arbitration clause as a “super contract” that 
was “especially favored under federal law”); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: 
Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 
581 (2007). 
 4. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). For a fuller discussion of Moses H. Cone, see infra Part II.A. 
 5. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25. Though Moses H. Cone spoke in terms of the federal 
policy favoring arbitration overriding contrary state law, it remained unsettled at the time of the 
decision whether the FAA applied in state courts and preempted state law. That question was put to 
rest one year later when the Supreme Court decided that the FAA did create substantive law that could 
preempt state law. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Court relied in significant 
part on Moses H. Cone in reaching that result. See id. at 12 (describing how Moses H. Cone reaffirmed 
that the FAA creates substantive law applicable in both federal and state courts).  
 6. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1636–38 (2005) (noting the “emergence of ‘mandatory’ arbitration” since the mid-1980s and 
explaining that a great increase in the use of arbitration clauses occurred “[o]nce the Supreme Court 
began to issue decisions stating that commercial arbitration was ‘favored’”). 
 7. See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 59, 62–64 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of F. Paul Bland, Senior 
Attorney, Public Justice) (noting that millions of consumers are subject to mandatory arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts and that arbitration clauses are prevalent in credit card agreements, 
financial services agreements, cell phone contracts, employment contracts, car sales, and securities 
brokerage services, among others); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary 
Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2012) (“The United States Supreme Court’s expansion of 
the Federal Arbitration Act (the ‘FAA’) has made arbitration clauses ubiquitous in consumer and 
employment contracts . . . .”); ZACHARY GIMA ET AL., FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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favoring arbitration, Moses H. Cone has been cited more than 30,000 
times by courts, advocates, and commentators.
8
  
Lower courts have seized upon the federal policy favoring arbitration 
to enforce arbitration clauses in a wide range of circumstances.
9
 This 
Article explores how courts have misread and wrongly extended Moses H. 
Cone to establish special rules regarding the interpretation of arbitration 
clauses that often are in conflict with traditional rules of contract 
interpretation designed to protect contracting parties. In doing so, courts 
have overlooked various facts indicating that Moses H. Cone should be 
given a narrow reading—one that effectuates the FAA’s overarching 
purpose of maintaining consistency with state contract law rather than a 
reading that overrides it.
10
  
In particular, this Article examines three areas in which courts have 
given arbitration clauses “super contract” status: (1) interpreting 
ambiguous contracts in favor of arbitration rather than in accordance with 
the traditional contract rule of interpreting ambiguities against the drafting 
party;
11
 (2) creating special rules that make it more difficult to find that a 
party waived the arbitration provision than to find that a party waived 
other contractual terms;
12
 and (3) interpreting arbitration clauses to bind 
individuals to arbitrate disputes with parties who never signed the 
arbitration clause.
13
 The result is that courts are substantially over-
enforcing arbitration clauses and that parties are wrongly losing their right 
to go to court. 
Determining the proper framework for interpreting the scope and 
breadth of arbitration clauses is an under-theorized issue. Much of the 
debate over arbitration has focused on whether arbitration is a fairer and 
better alternative to litigation,
14
 or on whether the FAA was intended to 
 
 
EVERYWHERE, PUB. CITIZEN 1 (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAnd 
Everywhere.pdf (conducting study indicating that “forced arbitration remains almost ubiquitous in 
many industries”). 
 8. A Westlaw KeyCite search performed on February 19, 2013 showed that the case had been 
cited in 33,158 different documents. 
 9. See generally F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: 
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS (6th ed. 2011) (collecting cases in which lower courts have 
enforced and/or rejected challenges to arbitration clauses). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See infra Part III.B.  
 13. See infra Part III.C. 
 14. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 
(asserting that the arguments that arbitration is unfair are overstated); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009) (disputing the assertion that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE AS SUPER CONTRACT 535 
 
 
 
 
create any substantive law at all.
15
 Substantially less attention has been 
paid to what rules should govern how arbitration clauses are interpreted.
16
 
This is somewhat surprising, given that questions involving arbitral 
waiver, scope, and enforcement of arbitration clauses by non-signatories 
are a frequent and growing source of litigation. 
The issue of the proper interpretive rules for arbitration clauses is an 
important one to address. First, challenging the scope and reach of an 
arbitration clause is one of the few remaining avenues for parties to keep a 
dispute in court and out of arbitration.
17
 State legislatures have been 
unable to protect a litigant’s right to go to court because the Supreme 
Court has held that virtually any state law that regulates arbitration is 
preempted by the FAA.
18
 The Supreme Court also has constricted the 
ability to challenge arbitration clauses on fairness grounds, as it has 
foreclosed certain unconscionability defenses to arbitration clauses,
19
 and 
required that other challenges to arbitration be resolved by the arbitrator 
rather than by a court.
20
 By contrast, the interpretive issues addressed in 
 
 
arbitration is a fairer alternative to litigation and suggesting that the opposite is true); Sternlight, supra 
note 6 (challenging the fairness of arbitration provisions).  
 15. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 16. For a general critique of the Supreme Court’s purported adherence to contract law in its 
arbitration jurisprudence, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration 
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Issue 1, 2012, at 129. Cunningham, however, makes a different argument than the one made here. He 
asserts that the federal policy favoring arbitration is “constitutionally suspect” absent explicit 
contractual agreement to establish such a policy. Id. at 131. This Article, by contrast, does not question 
Congress’s constitutional authority to establish a federal policy favoring arbitration. Rather, it asserts 
that any federal policy Congress did create is much more limited in scope than lower courts have given 
it. Additionally, Cunningham does not address the doctrinal areas covered in this Article.  
 17. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008) (noting that few avenues 
remain for challenging the enforcement of arbitration clauses). 
 18. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that the FAA 
prohibits states from enacting laws applicable “only to arbitration provisions”); see also David S. 
Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 app. A (2004) (identifying forty-nine 
different state statutes that were found preempted by judicial decisions from January 2002–April 2004 
alone). 
 19. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (finding that the application 
of state unconscionability principles to arbitration clauses banning class actions was rendered invalid 
by the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 20. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (holding that 
all challenges to “the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause,” must be 
decided by an arbitrator, even if the contract as a whole is ultimately determined to be void and 
unenforceable); see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that 
the FAA authorizes arbitrators to decide the threshold question of whether the arbitration clause is 
unenforceable). 
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this Article all concern open questions that the Supreme Court has yet to 
confront. 
Second, examining how courts give arbitration clauses favored 
treatment contributes valuable insight into the debate over whether the 
judiciary is too solicitous of arbitration or too skeptical of it. Many 
commentators believe that the judiciary has remained hostile to arbitration 
and that courts are actually under-enforcing arbitration provisions.
21
 The 
Supreme Court appears to agree with this view, as it indicated in its recent 
landmark decision holding that arbitration clauses that ban class actions 
must be enforced even if they are unconscionable under state law.
22
 This 
Article provides a counterpoint to that view.  
Finally, the loud and growing public debate over arbitration would 
benefit from a better understanding of how courts are interpreting 
arbitration clauses. Not only are arbitration clauses prevalent, they are 
enormously controversial. Mandatory arbitration has been the subject of 
widespread academic commentary, as well as repeated congressional, 
federal agency, and state legislative hearings regarding whether arbitration 
clauses are fair or whether they unjustly deprive individuals of the ability 
to seek redress for legal wrongs committed against them.
23
 Critics contend 
 
 
 21. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1286 
(2011) (noting that “academics and practitioners” have asserted a resurgence of the “‘judicial hostility’ 
to arbitration”); Bruhl, supra note 17, at 1483 (describing the “perception that some state courts are 
insufficiently attentive to the national policy favoring arbitration”); Cunningham, supra note 16, at 130 
(“Although some detect continued judicial aversion to arbitration, pervasive hostility died generations 
ago, yet today’s Court often speaks as if such hostility were a daily threat to civil society.”); Michael 
G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road 
Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 61 (“This article traces how, despite the laudable goals of the FAA, 
‘judicial hostility’ to arbitration has reared its unwelcome head once again.”); Susan Randall, Judicial 
Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 
(2004) (“This Article suggests that federal and state judges retain some measure of the long-standing 
judicial hostility toward arbitration . . . .”). 
 22. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing to two law reviews arguing that there is continued 
judicial hostility toward arbitration clauses when asserting that “California’s courts have been more 
likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts” (citing Stephen A. Broome, 
An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are 
Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, supra 
note 21, at 186–87)). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 
1311 (noting that 139 bills designed to limit or regulate arbitration have been introduced in Congress 
since 1995); Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1249–50 (describing the “fifteen-year academic debate” 
regarding the fairness of arbitration and documenting the rise in congressional hearings and legislative 
proposals to amend the Federal Arbitration Act); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to conduct a study and report to Congress concerning 
arbitration agreements in connection with consumer financial services and authorizing the agency to 
limit or prohibit a mandatory arbitration agreement if it finds, consistently with its study, that such 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/4
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that mandatory arbitration gives rise to systemic biases that favor large 
corporations over individual consumers, that arbitral proceedings are 
shrouded in secrecy and subject to limited judicial review, and that 
arbitration represents a form of private law enforcement that stifles the 
growth and development of legal principles.
24
 Supporters counter that 
arbitration is a faster, cheaper, and more efficient alternative to a flawed 
and overwhelmed judicial system.
25
 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the history of the 
enactment of the FAA and explains how the Act’s purpose was to make 
arbitration clauses no different from other contracts. Part II traces the 
development of the federal policy favoring arbitration and explains why it 
should not be read to give arbitration clauses special status relative to 
other contracts. Part III examines how courts have over-enforced 
arbitration clauses in three different areas: (1) interpreting ambiguous 
contracts to require arbitration, (2) restricting the circumstances in which a 
party will be found to have waived its right to arbitrate, and (3) expanding 
the rights of parties who never signed the arbitration agreement to force a 
dispute into arbitration. In each of these areas, courts have improperly 
relied on the federal policy favoring arbitration to interpret arbitration 
clauses in ways that conflict with traditional rules of contract 
interpretation. The conclusion suggests that state contract law should 
govern the interpretation of arbitration clauses just as it governs other 
contracts.  
I. PLACING ARBITRATION CLAUSES ON EQUAL FOOTING—THE 
ENACTMENT AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The legislative history of the FAA shows that the drafters simply 
intended for arbitration clauses to be treated like other contracts—no 
better, no worse. The effort to implement a federal arbitration law began in 
the early twentieth century and was driven primarily by an American Bar 
Association committee and its three zealous advocates, Julius Henry 
Cohen, Charles L. Bernheimer, and Kenneth Dayton.
26
 At that time, there 
 
 
limitations are in the public interest and will help protect consumers.); Schwartz, supra note 18 at app. 
A (identifying various state legislative proposals to regulate arbitration). 
 24. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.  
 26. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 83–101 (1992) (describing the role of the ABA, Cohen, Dayton and 
Bernheimer in drafting versions of the Act and advocating for its passage); Margaret L. Moses, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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truly was judicial hostility to arbitration. Arbitration agreements were 
essentially unenforceable in federal court. Because of the then-prevailing 
doctrinal view against “ouster” provisions in contracts, courts would 
refuse to enforce contracts that ousted jurisdiction from them and shifted 
dispute resolution into the hands of private arbitrators.
27
 Additionally, the 
dual agency doctrine that was recognized at the time “maintained that an 
arbitrator was merely a dual agent of the parties and, as such, either party 
could revoke his authority at any time.”28 Because arbitration agreements 
were essentially “revocable at will” by either party, courts would decline 
to order specific performance when an arbitration clause was breached.
29
 
As a result, a party who signed an agreement could refuse to arbitrate 
altogether, could use the threat of arbitration to gain an advantage in 
settlement negotiations, or could begin arbitration and then decide to resort 
to litigation instead if the arbitration did not appear to be proceeding 
favorably.
30
 As explained by Cohen and Dayton, the Act was driven by the 
fact that “these clauses are not regarded in the same light as other 
contractual obligations.”31 
 
 
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted 
by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101–13 (2006) (discussing Cohen’s and Bernheimer’s role).  
 27. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 210–11 & n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and 
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13–15 (1924) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, ABA) (discussing the need for an 
arbitration statute in order to overcome problems created by the ouster doctrine); David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 74. The ouster doctrine has been criticized for being 
overly formalistic, reflecting an irrational judicial hostility to arbitration, and unduly interfering with 
the freedom of contract. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 
982–84 (2d Cir. 1942); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 232 P. 680, 681 (Colo. 1925) 
(“[I]t would be absurd to say that any consideration of public policy forbids a common-law arbitration 
incidentally involving the determination of a question of law, because such an award would oust the 
established judicial tribunals of their jurisdiction.”); Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 296 
N.W. 475, 477 (Minn. 1941) (“Arbitration simply removes a controversy from the arena of litigation. 
It is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement or that peculiar 
offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to sue. Each disposes of issues without 
litigation. One no more than the other ousts the courts of jurisdiction.”); see also Kenneth R. Davis, 
When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 
49, 60–61 (1997) (describing some criticisms of the ouster doctrine). 
 28. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 74; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: 
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 645 n.32 
(1996). 
 29. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 26, at 101 (noting that prior to the enactment of the FAA, “a 
party to an arbitration agreement could at any time prior to the award simply refuse to arbitrate and 
courts would not enforce the agreement”); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 73–74. 
 30. See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 644–45. 
 31. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 
265, 270 (1926).  
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It was this non-enforcement ill that the FAA was designed to remedy. 
The drafters of the Act did not want arbitration clauses to be unenforceable 
simply because of their status as arbitration clauses. Instead, they wanted 
arbitration clauses to be treated just like any other contract. Section 2, the 
main substantive provision of the Act, embodies this idea of unifying the 
law of arbitration agreements with the rest of the law of contracts. It states 
that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”32 The House Report accompanying the legislation indicates 
that the purpose was to place arbitration agreements “upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs,” and also emphasizes that 
“[a]rbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and [that] the 
effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his 
agreement.”33 Cohen stated in a written brief that was submitted into the 
record of a Joint Hearing on the bill that “[a]n agreement for arbitration is 
in its essence a business contract. It differs in no essential from other 
commercial agreements. It should stand upon the same plane and be 
regarded by the law in the same light.”34 Cohen and Dayton make the 
same point in a post-enactment article, explaining that arbitration 
agreements “should be as inviolable as any other business contract.”35 The 
Supreme Court has since recognized the FAA’s narrow purpose of making 
“arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more 
so.”36 
The framers of the FAA recognized that arbitration agreements were 
not to be interpreted by special principles of federal arbitration law, but 
according to state contract law. Cohen and Dayton emphasized that “[i]t is 
no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what 
contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws. To be sure, whether or not 
a contract exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction 
wherein the contract was made.”37 Consequently, when it comes to 
 
 
 32. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924). 
 34. Joint Hearings, supra note 27, at 33, 38 (written statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, 
ABA); accord id. at 38–39 (“But, if the contract for sale or promissory note is to be recognized and 
enforced by the courts, why should a contract for arbitration stand upon a different plane?”).  
 35. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 31, at 278. 
 36. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (emphasis 
added). 
 37. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 31, at 276; accord Schwartz, supra note 27, at 38 (explaining 
that the goal of the FAA was to make arbitration agreements the same as other contracts); see also 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (“[T]he 
interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law . . . .”). 
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interpreting arbitration clauses, courts “should apply ordinary state-law 
principles that govern the formation of contracts.”38 
Several scholars have examined this legislative history and have 
argued, quite persuasively, that the FAA was intended to have a much 
narrower reach than the Supreme Court has given it. Some have argued 
that the FAA was intended merely as a procedural statute applicable only 
in federal court, and that it was never intended to create substantive law or 
exert any preemptive effect over state laws that regulate or restrain 
arbitration.
39
 Others have argued that the Act was intended to apply only to 
business-to-business disputes and was not intended to apply, as it now 
routinely is, to individual-to-business disputes, such as consumer 
protection and employment discrimination claims.
40
 Still others have 
argued that the Act was designed to address contract disputes only and 
should not bind individuals to arbitrate statutory claims.
41
 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has remained unconvinced and, since Moses H. Cone, has 
consistently given the FAA vast substantive content and widespread 
preemptive effect.
42
 
This Article’s argument, however, differs from those critiques of the 
Supreme Court’s reading of the FAA in that it does not require revisiting 
those debates or overturning Supreme Court precedent that gives the FAA 
 
 
 38. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Hightower v. 
GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, 
courts apply state law principles governing contract formation. There is no dispute that North Carolina 
law controls in this case . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 117 (“[T]he proposed [FAA] was intended to apply 
only in federal courts. It was never intended to create substantive federal regulatory law superseding 
state law under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.”); Moses, supra note 26, at 111–12; 
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 130–39 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s determination that the FAA 
applies in state court was incorrect). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: 
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 
(2002) (arguing that the legislative history of the FAA could be read to support the conclusion that the 
FAA was intended to create substantive law applicable in both state and federal court). 
 40. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 27, at 75–81 (arguing that the framers intended for the FAA 
to be limited to commercial disputes between business entities); Sternlight, supra note 28, at 647 
(“Most commentators have concluded that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual 
transactions between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily to 
transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable consumer.”).   
 41. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 26, at 139 (“Moreover, the FAA was never described in the 
legislative history as applying to any claims other than contract and maritime claims. Nor is there 
evidence that anyone at the time believed the FAA made statutory claims arbitrable.”) (footnote 
omitted); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
803 (2009); see also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 712–19 (1999) (arguing that from a normative perspective, parties 
should not be required to arbitrate statutory claims under the FAA). 
 42. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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broad preemptive effect.
43
 In other words, even if the Supreme Court is 
correct that the FAA creates substantive law applicable in state court and 
applies beyond the arena of commercial disputes, courts are still deviating 
from the Act’s basic purposes by giving arbitration clauses protections that 
do not exist for other contracts.
44
 The problem identified here, as seen in 
the next Part, arises instead from a misreading of a single paragraph of 
poorly-considered Supreme Court dicta regarding the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.  
II. THE FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION 
From the enactment of the FAA until the early 1980s, most courts, with 
a few exceptions, followed the FAA’s original purposes and applied state 
contract law when interpreting arbitration agreements.
45
 How, then, did the 
FAA become transformed from a statute seeking to reject outdated ouster 
doctrines into one that spawned millions of arbitration clauses in industries 
ranging from banking and finance to employment to medical services? 
This Part suggests that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Moses H. Cone 
regarding a national policy favoring arbitration has played a substantial 
role in that expansion. It also suggests, however, that both the history of 
the Moses H. Cone case itself and the sloppy language the Court used in 
articulating the policy favoring arbitration show that the case should be 
given a narrow reading that maintains consistency with state contract law, 
rather than a broad reading that elevates arbitration clauses above other 
contracts.  
 
 
 43. Lawrence Cunningham, for example, has critiqued a number of Supreme Court arbitration 
decisions for ignoring the constraints of state contract law. Cunningham, supra note 16. Regardless of 
the force of Cunningham’s critique, unless the Court overrules those decisions, they will remain 
governing law. By contrast, no reversal of Supreme Court precedent is required to rectify the three 
areas addressed in this Article. 
 44. Some commentators have questioned the “equal footing” with other contracts rationale on the 
grounds that contract law necessarily treats different contracts differently, such as by requiring some 
contracts to be in writing while allowing others to be oral. Rather, as one commentator argues, the 
intent of the FAA should be seen as prohibiting discrimination against arbitration clauses relative to 
other contracts. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 
(2011). Whether phrased as “equal footing” or “nondiscrimination,” however, the outcome is the same. 
Courts are singling out arbitration agreements for special treatment, which is inconsistent with the 
FAA. 
 45. See MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 138–39 (explaining that most arbitrations were conducted on 
the “assumption that state law governed” and that many courts agreed, although noting that as time 
passed more and more courts started to apply federal law in place of state law). 
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A. Moses H. Cone 
Despite subsequent judicial interpretation to the contrary, the national 
policy favoring arbitration that emerged out of Moses H. Cone was not 
intended to give arbitration clauses more favored treatment than other 
contracts. The first indication of this is that the Court in Moses H. Cone 
had no business speculating about the substantive reach of the FAA 
because that is not what the case was about. The main issue in the case did 
not concern the meaning of the FAA, but an esoteric doctrine of federal 
abstention.
46
 In fact, although the case did involve an arbitration provision, 
neither party disputed that the provision applied to the dispute in the 
case.
47
 
In Moses H. Cone, the Mercury Construction Company contracted with 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and an architect to build additions to 
the hospital.
48
 All disputes concerning the contract were to go first to the 
architect, and if that failed to resolve the dispute, either party had the 
option of initiating a binding arbitration.
49
 Following the completion of the 
work, a dispute arose regarding Mercury’s entitlement to reimbursement 
for certain costs.
50
 The hospital filed a declaratory judgment action in state 
court seeking an order that Mercury was not entitled to any funds and that 
it had waived its right to initiate any arbitration to try and collect them.
51
 
Mercury subsequently filed an action in federal district court under 
Section 4 of the FAA,
52
 which permits a party to file a federal court action 
seeking an order compelling arbitration of the underlying dispute.
53
 
Applying a doctrine known as Colorado River abstention,
54
 the federal 
district court abstained from exercising its jurisdiction in favor of allowing 
the state action involving the identical question of whether Mercury could 
 
 
 46. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (describing 
abstention as “the principal issue to be addressed” in the case). 
 47. Id. at 29 (noting that the appellant “does not contest the substantive correctness of the Court 
of Appeals’s holding” that the dispute is subject to arbitration, but instead asserted that the Court of 
Appeals should not have reached that question when it was not first addressed by the district court). 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. at 4–5. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
 51. Id. at 7. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another 
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . 
for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”). 
 54. Colorado River abstention permits a federal court to stay federal litigation in favor of 
ongoing parallel state litigation involving the same issue. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976). 
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compel arbitration to proceed.
55
 It therefore did not reach the question of 
whether the dispute should be resolved in arbitration.
56
 The Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, reversed.
57
 It rejected the district court’s grounds for 
abstention, but also went further by directing the district court to enter an 
order compelling arbitration, even though the district court did not 
consider that question and the parties did not brief it in the court of 
appeals.
58
 In addressing whether the dispute was arbitrable, the Fourth 
Circuit did not determine whether or not there had been a waiver but 
simply decided that question was better suited to the arbitrator than to the 
court.
59
 In other words, the court ordered arbitration so that the arbitrator 
could address Mercury’s defenses to arbitration. 
Thus, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the only issues 
before the Court were whether the district court should have abstained and 
whether the court of appeals erred in compelling arbitration rather than 
remanding that issue to the district court to decide in the first instance, and 
possibly whether the question of waiver was an appropriate one for the 
arbitrator to decide. The case presented no dispute about the scope and 
meaning of the arbitration clause, or about whether the FAA created any 
rules regarding the construction and interpretation of arbitration clauses. 
In affirming the court of appeals, the Court acknowledged that the 
enforceability of the underlying arbitration clause was ancillary to the 
dispute and that abstention was “the principal issue to be addressed” in the 
case.
60
 While the Court briefly addressed the propriety of the court of 
appeals’s decision to order arbitration, that portion of the decision 
consumed only two paragraphs of a twenty-six page opinion and was 
devoted largely to addressing why the court of appeals had the authority to 
 
 
 55. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 29 (acknowledging that the district court did not reach the issue of arbitrability); accord 
id. at 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to enter an order 
compelling arbitration, even though that issue was not considered by the District Court.”). 
 57. In re Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1 
(1983). 
 58. See In re Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d at 948 n.1 (Hall, J., dissenting) (“The majority 
opinion, which in effect directs arbitration, will come as a surprise to all parties. No one argued that 
this court should decide that issue.”). But see Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 29 (“The Court of Appeals 
had in the record full briefs and evidentiary submissions from both parties on the merits of arbitrability 
. . . .”). 
 59. In re Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d at 940. The court also rejected the hospital’s other 
challenge to Mercury’s federal action to compel arbitration, which was that the dispute did not involve 
interstate commerce. Id. at 942. However, resolving whether the dispute involved interstate commerce 
was ancillary to the question of whether arbitration was required. The fact that the court found that the 
dispute involved interstate commerce meant only that the Federal Arbitration Act would apply to the 
case rather than North Carolina’s arbitration statute.  
 60. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13. 
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order arbitration as a matter of procedure, rather than addressing whether 
the court of appeals should have ordered arbitration as a matter of 
substantive law.
61
  
The Court’s statements about the national policy favoring arbitration 
emerged only in determining that federal law rather than state law 
governed the underlying dispute over arbitrability, which is a factor that 
counsels against abstaining in favor of a parallel state-court proceeding.
62
 
But to resolve that question, the Court merely needed to decide, as it did, 
that “[f]ederal law in the terms of the [Federal] Arbitration Act governs 
[the arbitrability] issue in either state or federal court,”63 an issue that the 
Court acknowledged was not in dispute.
64
  
Nonetheless, the Court went on to include its now-famous language: 
Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any 
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of 
the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the 
coverage of the Act.
65
 
The Court could have stopped there by simply establishing that the 
FAA creates substantive law, without speculating as to what that 
substantive law might be. Instead, the Court went on to state:  
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved 
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
66
 
Thus, in a case that presented no disputed question regarding the scope 
or meaning of arbitration, the Supreme Court articulated a new policy 
regarding arbitration clauses without examining the FAA’s original 
purpose and without regard for the policy’s effect on traditional state 
contract principles. The result is a vague and poorly-considered policy 
statement that coexists with the FAA’s purposes only when read narrowly 
 
 
 61. Id. at 29. 
 62. Id. at 23–26. 
 63. Id. at 24. 
 64. Id. at 26 n.34 (explaining that section 3 of the Act applies requires both federal and state 
courts to stay litigation when a valid arbitration agreement exists). 
 65. Id. at 24. 
 66. Id. at 24–25. 
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to keep arbitration clauses in conformity with general contract law 
principles.
67
 As suggested below, reading the policy broadly, as courts 
have done, makes the federal policy favoring arbitration difficult to 
reconcile with the rest of the FAA and also highlights the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies in the Court’s statements.68 
B. Moses H. Cone’s Limitations 
There are several reasons to think that the Court’s newly-minted 
federal policy favoring arbitration was not designed to differentiate 
arbitration clauses from other contract provisions, beyond the simple fact 
 
 
 67. This is not to say that a federal policy favoring arbitration is necessarily good or bad as a 
policy matter, or that Congress could not have created such a policy if it so desired. My point here is 
simply that Congress did not intend for the FAA to embody the type of policy favoring arbitration 
adopted in Moses H. Cone and subsequently expanded by lower courts. 
 68. To be sure, one could argue that the federal policy favoring arbitration is consistent with state 
law. Many states have adopted their own arbitration statutes and a pro-arbitration policy of resolving 
doubts in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Rath v. Network Mktg., L.C., 790 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001) (“We begin our discussion with the general principle that all doubts regarding the 
scope of an arbitration agreement, as well as any questions about waivers thereof, should be construed 
in favor of arbitration rather than against it.”). However, the fact that states have similar pro-arbitration 
policies more likely shows how states piggyback on federal pronouncements regarding arbitration 
rather than the other way around. The ill-fated judicial expansion of arbitration law thus “creeps” into 
state contract law and then becomes part of the background contract law that is applied to arbitration 
agreements. In other words, the notion that the “federal policy favoring arbitration” reflects state law 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Expressions by state courts of their pro-arbitration policies appear 
to track the language of Moses H. Cone itself or its collective-bargaining predecessors. See, e.g., Rath, 
790 So. 2d at 463. But for these federal decisions, it is not certain that states would have independently 
derived such a policy. The result is a pernicious feedback loop by which federal courts create new 
arbitration principles that deviate from state contract law and which are then followed by state courts. 
That new law becomes incorporated into state law, which courts can then point to when they claim to 
be applying state contract principles in interpreting arbitration clauses. In so doing, courts 
unintentionally broaden the scope and reach of the FAA while purporting to remain faithful to state 
contract law. See, e.g., 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001) (describing the doctrine of equitable estoppel in arbitration by 
primary reference to federal-court decisions rather to state contract decisions). 
 Additionally, since Moses H. Cone declared that the federal policy applies in state courts and 
preempts contrary state law, states have had no choice but to adopt a pro-arbitration policy, at least 
with respect to all cases involving interstate commerce. See, e.g., Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 
955–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“This case is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, which by its 
terms applies to an arbitration clause in a contract involving interstate commerce. With respect to these 
contracts, federal law supersedes the Florida Arbitration Code, and the Florida Arbitration Code is 
applied in such cases only to the extent it is not inconsistent with federal law.”) (citations omitted). 
Additionally, the Policy Statement to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), which is a model 
law that many states have used as a guide in adopting their own arbitration statutes, specifically notes 
that it was drafted with the understanding that “state arbitration acts must be consistent with the federal 
pro-arbitration policy.” Francis J. Pavetti, Policy Statement: Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), 
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION ¶ 3 (May 15, 2000), available at: http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/arbitration/arbpswr.pdf.  
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that the policy was created in a case that was not really about arbitration or 
the meaning of the FAA. The slapdash nature of the way in which the 
Court articulated the policy shows both that the Court’s statements were 
poorly considered and highlights how giving the policy a broad reading 
places it in irreconcilable conflict with the FAA’s goals and purposes.  
First, what is perhaps most noticeable about the Court’s articulation of 
the policy favoring arbitration is that the Court never attempted to tie its 
statements either to the statutory text or to congressional intent.
69
 This is 
troubling given that the Court was not expressing an opinion but was 
purporting to describe the aims of the FAA’s framers. In the words of one 
commentator, the policy favoring arbitration was created “out of whole 
cloth.”70 In fact, the policy appears to represent an entirely new 
development in arbitration law. For most of the period following the 
enactment of the FAA, the Court was “at most, policy-neutral respecting 
the desirability of arbitration,” with the “emphatic federal policy in favor 
of arbitral dispute resolution” emerging only in the wake of Moses H. 
Cone.
71
  
Second, not only are the Court’s pronouncements unsupported, but 
when construed broadly, they appear to be inconsistent with the Act’s goal 
of making arbitration clauses like other contact provisions. The Court’s 
primary flaw was transforming a statute that eliminated a presumption 
against arbitration into one that establishes a presumption favoring 
arbitration.
72
 Eliminating the presumption against arbitration simply 
creates neutrality regarding arbitration clauses: they are no better and no 
worse than other contracts. A broad reading to Moses H. Cone, however, 
suggests that arbitration clauses should be given special favor as a matter 
 
 
 69. The Court does, however, cite a number of lower court cases to support its conclusion. See 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.31. Those cases, however, all base their statements on a series of 
Supreme Court cases involving the interpretation of arbitration clauses in the context of collective 
bargaining disputes. As explained below, the policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor 
disputes and avoiding industrial strife does not necessarily translate outside of the 
collective-bargaining context. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 70. Moses, supra note 26, at 123. See also Cunningham, supra note 16, at 133–34; Jean R. 
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1997) (asserting that the Court never provided the source for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration over litigation).  
 71. Drahozal, supra note 14, at 701, 703 (quoting 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 14.1 at 14:3 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).  
 72. See Jean R. Sternlight, Protecting Franchises from Abusive Arbitration Clauses, 20 
FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 77 n.6 (2000) (“There is a big difference between eliminating a hostility and 
stating a preference, with a whole lot of room in between.”) (quoting Cliff Palefsky, Arbitrary 
Arbitration: The Founders Would Frown on Mandatory ADR, S.F. DAILY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 4). 
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of federal law—even if state contract law would hold otherwise—because 
the Court established that if there is any ambiguity over whether an 
arbitration clause covers a particular dispute, that ambiguity must be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.  
The conflict between the Court’s reading of the federal policy as 
favoring arbitration clauses over other contract provisions and the FAA’s 
purpose of equating arbitration clauses with other contract provisions is 
further evidenced by the uneasy tension between the federal policy and the 
Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on the contractual nature of 
arbitration law. The Supreme Court often has stressed that “arbitration is a 
matter of contract,”73 that both courts and arbitrators “must ‘give effect to 
the contractual rights and expectations of the parties,’”74 and that the FAA 
does not “alter background principles of state contract law regarding the 
scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by them).”75 
Indeed, when the Court has cited Moses H. Cone for the proposition that 
all doubts concerning arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration, 
it has stated in the same opinion or even the same paragraph that the FAA 
makes arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not 
more so.
76
 Similarly, the Court has emphasized repeatedly the primacy of 
the parties’ intent rather than general policy considerations in deciding if a 
dispute is arbitrable. In several cases, the Court has stated that courts may 
not “use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement,”77 and 
that “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which 
he has not agreed so to submit.”78 
The Court’s statements are difficult to reconcile with the federal policy 
favoring arbitration if that policy is construed to justify treating arbitration 
clauses more favorably than other contracts. If it is uncertain whether the 
parties to a dispute agreed to submit that dispute to arbitration, using the 
FAA to resolve those uncertainties in favor of arbitration, as Moses H. 
 
 
 73. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
 75. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009). 
 76. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293–94 (2002) (noting both that “[t]he 
FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts” and that 
“ambiguities in the language of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration”). 
 77. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 (2010); accord Waffle 
House, 534 U.S. at 294 (“[W]e look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to 
general policy goals, to determine the scope of the agreement.”). 
 78. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Cone suggests, puts the cart before the horse. The FAA only applies where 
the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. Moreover, by 
ordering courts to apply the federal policy to resolve doubts in favor of 
arbitration, Moses H. Cone suggests applying policy considerations to 
establish the parties’ intent over whether to arbitrate a particular dispute. 
This conflict highlights just how much a broad reading of the federal 
policy favoring arbitration appears to depart from traditional contract law 
principles. 
Third, the Court’s statement contains internal inconsistencies which 
suggest that the policy was not intended to have a far-reaching doctrinal 
impact. In the beginning of its description of the policy, the Court first 
says that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”79 This appears to refer to questions 
relating to interpretation of the terms of an arbitration agreement. In other 
words, if the parties have agreed to an arbitration provision, but there is 
some question as to whether the scope of the provision covers the dispute 
in question—suppose the clause requires arbitration of disputes arising out 
of the contract, but the dispute involves a statutory claim such as 
employment discrimination—then the arbitration clause must be 
interpreted to cover the dispute and require arbitration.  
The remainder of the sentence, however, states: “whether the problem 
at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation 
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”80 Other than a dispute 
involving “the construction of the contract language itself,” none of the 
identified defenses involve questions of the agreement’s scope or 
interpretation. Most defenses to arbitrability do not involve interpretation 
of the arbitration clause. Rather, they are raised where the parties agree 
that the arbitration clause, as written, governs the dispute but that the 
clause is nonetheless unenforceable for some other reason, say because the 
contract was never validly formed, the arbitration provision is 
unconscionable or in violation of public policy, or one of the parties 
waived its right to pursue arbitration.
81
 That inconsistency suggests that 
the Court may not have been thinking clearly about the impact of a federal 
policy favoring arbitration or intending for it to have significant doctrinal 
implications.  
 
 
 79. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 
 80. Id. at 25. 
 81. For a sampling of various defenses to the enforcement of arbitration clauses, see BLAND ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 69–214, 271–96.  
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To be sure, the Court’s endorsement of a federal policy favoring 
arbitration in the FAA has some pedigree. The Court’s language is very 
similar to language that the Court used in a series of collective-bargaining 
arbitration cases under federal labor statutes. In evaluating arbitration 
disputes in collective-bargaining agreements, which are governed by the 
Federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), the Court has long 
held that arbitration should be ordered “unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of 
coverage.”82 But the cases relying on that policy also make very clear that 
the policy is one arising under the LMRA and make no mention of the 
FAA.
83
 Moreover, other commentators have pointed out that in the labor 
law arena, fostering arbitration has been seen as a way of avoiding labor 
strife and promoting industrial peace.
84
 The federal policy promoting 
arbitration of collective bargaining disputes also is based on the notion that 
a collective bargaining agreement “is not an ordinary contract” and should 
not always be treated like an ordinary contract.
85
 This contrasts sharply 
with the FAA, which is motivated not by the public purpose of promoting 
labor peace, but primarily by the private purpose of making arbitration 
agreements just like other contracts.
86
 Thus, the federal policy, when 
 
 
 82. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582–83. 
 83. See id. at 582; accord John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) 
(“This Court has in the past recognized the central role of arbitration in effectuating national labor 
policy.”). 
 84. Moses, supra note 26, at 124 (“[T]here are strong national policy justifications for favoring 
arbitration of collective bargaining agreements—to prevent strikes and worker violence, to preserve 
labor peace, and to promote industrial stabilization.”); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism 
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Issues 1 & 2, Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 43 (“Significantly, the analogy between 
federal labor policy and the FAA is faulty. Arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements is 
a part of a substantive national labor policy. It is a quid pro quo for a union’s giving up the right to 
strike, and therefore a stabilizing and therapeutic influence that promotes industrial stabilization and 
industrial peace nationwide.”) (quotations marks omitted).  
 85. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 550 (holding that a corporate successor was bound to the 
predecessor’s arbitration provision and collective bargaining agreement even though “the principles of 
law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a 
contracting party”). 
 86. Moreover, even if the policy favoring labor arbitration could justify a similar policy favoring 
arbitration under the FAA, it is notable that the labor policy has been given a much more constrained 
reading than that given to Moses H. Cone. The presumption favoring labor arbitration “does not extend 
beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better 
position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA.” Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 
70, 78 (1998). Indeed, the presumption does not apply to determining whether statutory claims or other 
claims that do not directly require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are subject 
to arbitration. Id. at 79. By contrast, the federal policy established in Moses H. Cone applies regardless 
of whether the dispute involves a contract, other common-law, or statutory claim. See, e.g., Mitsubishi 
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examined carefully, is something that should be read in harmony with 
state contract law, not as something that elevates arbitration clauses to a 
higher status than other contract provisions.
87
 
C. A Life of its Own 
Notwithstanding the various indicia that Moses H. Cone’s federal 
policy favoring arbitration should be read narrowly, it has spawned a 
revolution in the arbitration field. Following the Court’s statements in 
Moses H. Cone that the FAA creates federal substantive law, and 
particularly in combination with the Court’s decision one year later in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA applies in state courts and 
preempts state laws that disfavor arbitration,
88
 the use of arbitration 
clauses exploded. Arbitration clauses are now inserted in millions of 
contracts and are pervasive in many spheres, including banking, credit 
cards, home building, investment advising, cell phones, and auto dealers.
89
 
 
 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (finding statutory claims 
arbitrable and relying in part on the federal policy favoring arbitration). 
 87. One might argue that even if the Moses H. Cone Court did not intend the broad reading of the 
federal policy favoring arbitration that subsequent lower courts have given it, the fact that Congress 
has not amended the FAA to correct the current interpretation of the FAA shows that Congress is 
satisfied with a broad reading and has essentially ratified it. That argument is unpersuasive for several 
reasons. First, the fact that Congress has not acted to overturn a judicial interpretation of a statute does 
not mean that Congress has ratified it. Congress may fail to amend a statute for any number of reasons, 
many of which have little to do with its view of the statute’s substance. Indeed, the current emphasis 
on congressional gridlock merely underscores this point. See, e.g., Robert Reich, Why Congress’ 
Gridlock Paralyzes Democracy, Not Government, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 15, 2013), http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2013/0815/Why-Congress-gridlock-paralyzes-democracy-
not-government (“With just 15 bills signed into law so far this year, the 113th Congress is on pace to 
be the most unproductive since at least the 1940s.”). For this reason, the Supreme Court has refused to 
rely on congressional silence to infer approval of the Court’s interpretation of a statute, particularly 
when Congress has not revisited the statute in a comprehensive way. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 292 (2001) (“And when, as here, Congress has not comprehensively revised a statutory 
scheme but has made only isolated amendments, we have spoken more bluntly: ‘It is “impossible to 
assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents” affirmative 
congressional approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.’”) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)). The FAA has been amended only once since Moses H. Cone, 
and that involved a relatively minor amendment in 1988 to add a right of interlocutory appeal to orders 
denying motions to compel arbitration. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (adding 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16). Moreover, even if Congress is aware of the federal policy favoring arbitration, it is far from 
clear that Congress is aware of, let alone satisfied with, the way that the federal policy has been 
interpreted in the areas discussed in this Article.  
 88. 465 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1984). Southland concerned the arbitrability of a dispute between 7-
Eleven convenience store franchisees and Southland Corp., the owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven, 
alleging that Southland had committed fraud and omitted necessary disclosures under the California 
Franchise Investment Law. Id. at 3–4. 
 89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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Given that the enforceability of arbitration agreements is likely “the single 
most litigated contractual issue” today,90 the impact of the judiciary’s 
interpretation of Moses H. Cone has significant implications.  
As the use of arbitration has grown, particularly in consumer and 
employment contracts, it has become increasingly controversial. Although 
the merits and demerits of arbitration as a policy matter are outside the 
scope of this paper, detractors of arbitration argue that arbitration 
systematically disfavors consumers and employees relative to the 
corporations that stand on the other side of the contract. Arbitration 
opponents assert that many corporations draft arbitration clauses with 
terms that are designed to favor them, by barring plaintiffs from 
proceeding in class actions, shortening statutes of limitations, requiring the 
parties to keep the arbitration proceedings secret, and limiting the ability 
of parties to seek discovery or obtain necessary evidence to support their 
claims.
91
 They also argue that arbitration creates a “repeat player” bias 
whereby arbitrators are inclined to support the repeat player—most often 
the corporation—out of fear that they will not be chosen by the company 
for future cases if they rule against it;
92
 however, evidence regarding the 
bias so far appears inconclusive.
93
 Finally, detractors point out that 
arbitrators act in secret, that arbitrators are not bound to apply the law in 
the way judges are, and that the FAA provides for only extremely limited 
judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision.94 
By contrast, supporters assert that arbitration offers a faster, cheaper, 
and more efficient alternative to litigation.
95
 They note that it offers greater 
 
 
 90. Frank Z. LaForge, Note, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory Defendants 
Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 225 (2005). 
 91. See, e.g., BLAND ET AL., supra note 9, at 4–14 (canvassing the various criticisms of binding 
mandatory arbitration). 
 92. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics 
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); BLAND ET 
AL., supra note 9, § 1.3.3 at 5–6 (“There is some empirical evidence and a good deal of commentary 
suggesting that arbitrators do, in fact, have a tendency to favor ‘repeat player’ clients.”). 
 93. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 13–16 (2009) (describing no statistically 
significant repeat-player effect in its analysis of American Arbitration Association data and ascribing 
any repeat player effect to better case screening by repeat players than to arbitrator bias).  
 94. Section 10 of the FAA provides the grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 
(2012). Those grounds are limited mostly to whether the award resulted from corruption or fraud, or if 
the arbitrators grossly exceeded their powers. Id. Courts have interpreted the grounds for vacating an 
award extremely narrowly. See, e.g., In re Andros Compania Maritimia, S.A., 579 F.2d 691, 703 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (“We have consistently accorded the narrowest of readings to the Arbitration Act's 
authorization to vacate awards . . . .”). 
 95. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Consumer 
Contracts, in 17TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND 
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predictability to businesses and helps reduce the passing of litigation costs 
onto consumers that can lead to higher prices.
96
 Supporters argue that 
arbitration may increase access to justice for many individuals who cannot 
seek redress in court because litigation has become too expensive and 
time-consuming.
97
 Supporters also rely on some studies suggesting that 
individuals fare better (or at least no worse) in arbitration than in 
litigation,
98
 though the value of that evidence has been vigorously 
disputed.
99
  
In light of the controversy surrounding arbitration, it is not surprising 
that many persons, both individual and corporate, have challenged the 
enforceability and applicability of the arbitration agreements that they 
have signed. But many of the avenues for contesting arbitration clauses 
have been cut off by a Supreme Court that has been very friendly to 
arbitration. Numerous state legislative attempts to make arbitration fairer 
have failed
100
 because the Supreme Court has determined that the FAA 
 
 
PRACTICE, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, B-1946 201, 221–22 (Practicing Law Institute 2012) 
(describing one study of arbitration participants showing that a majority thought that arbitration was 
faster, cheaper and simpler than going to court); Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer 
Financial Services Litigation, 43 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (“The primary advantage for 
consumers in binding arbitration is that it offers at least the possibility of a faster and cheaper 
decisionmaking mechanism for their complaints.”).  
 96. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95, 105–06 (2007) 
(prepared statement of Peter B. Rutledge) (arguing that eliminating mandatory arbitration would 
“increase the costs of dispute resolution, and a portion of these costs would be passed onto employees 
(in the form of lower wages), consumers (in the form of higher prices) and investors (in the form of 
lower share prices)”). 
 97. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64 (2001) 
(claiming that mandatory arbitration actually expands opportunities by giving plaintiffs the ability to 
bring cases that they could not bring in court); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105, 123 (2000) (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that 
may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of 
money than disputes concerning commercial contracts.”). 
 98. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path 
for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1578 (2005) (“Still, despite the flaws, there are some 
conclusions about which we can be confident regarding the ‘fairness' of arbitration. First, there is no 
evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly better in litigation. In fact, the opposite may be true.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1287–89 (critiquing the methodologies of empirical 
studies on arbitration); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create 
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1108–09 n.69 (2012) (concluding that the evidence regarding 
outcomes in arbitration versus litigation “is mixed”). 
 100. For a sampling of state attempts to regulate arbitration that have been found to be preempted 
by the FAA, see Schwartz, supra note 18, at app. A (identifying forty-nine different state statutes that 
were found preempted by judicial decisions in the years 2002–2004 alone). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE AS SUPER CONTRACT 553 
 
 
 
 
overrides any state law that is specifically directed toward arbitration.
101
 
Similarly, some general state contract-law doctrines that exist to protect 
against one-sided bargains and to preserve fairness have been found 
inapplicable to arbitration agreements.
102
 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has held that other challenges to contracts containing arbitration clauses, 
including that the contract is illegal and void or that it was procured by 
fraud, do not affect the validity of the arbitration clauses even if they may 
invalidate the rest of the contract, and that such disputes must be decided 
in arbitration rather than by a court.
103
 As a result, challenges to the scope 
and interpretation of an arbitration clause are one of the few avenues left 
for litigants seeking to keep their case in court.
104
 
By reading the federal policy favoring arbitration broadly to confer 
special status on arbitration clauses, courts have misapplied it and 
consequently have over-enforced arbitration clauses in ways that are 
inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the FAA.
105
 Instead of applying 
traditional rules of state contract law, courts have fashioned special rules 
unique to arbitration agreements that give such agreements advantages 
over other contracts.
106
 Ironically, these special rules often have been 
crafted by courts that are seeking to rein in what they perceive as 
 
 
 101. See id.; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that the FAA 
prohibits states from enacting laws applicable “only to arbitration provisions”); see also supra note 18 
and accompanying text.  
 102. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the FAA 
preempts state law that invalidated classwide bans in arbitration clauses as unconscionable). 
 103. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (holding that all 
challenges to “the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause,” must be decided 
by an arbitrator, even if the contract as a whole is ultimately determined to be void and unenforceable). 
 104. Similarly, a challenge to whether a valid agreement for arbitration was ever formed between 
the parties remains a viable avenue for fighting arbitration. For a discussion of contract formation 
issues as they relate to arbitration, see BLAND ET AL., supra note 9, at 107–143. 
 105. For a discussion of the purpose of the FAA, see supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text. 
 106. While this Article focuses on ways in which the federal policy has been misused in 
interpreting the scope of arbitration clauses and defenses against their enforcement, the policy has been 
misused in other contexts as well. Although Moses H. Cone makes clear that courts should apply a 
policy favoring arbitration when interpreting the scope of arbitration clauses, Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983), courts also have relied on the federal 
policy to give expansive readings to the FAA’s statutory text, an issue that has nothing to do with the 
scope of arbitration provisions. Specifically, a number of courts of appeals relied on the federal policy 
favoring arbitration to hold that a statutory exemption that makes the FAA inapplicable to contracts of 
employees engaged in interstate commerce should be read extremely narrowly to apply only to 
transportation workers rather than all employees. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 
274 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The circuit courts have uniformly reasoned that the strong federal policy in favor 
of arbitration requires a narrow reading of this section 1 exemption.”); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. 
Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 601–02 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on “a policy that strongly favors private 
arbitration” in agreeing with those courts of appeals that have interpreted section 1 narrowly). 
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continued judicial hostility to arbitration, when, in reality, that purported 
hostility simply represents decisions placing arbitration clauses on equal 
footing with other contracts, as the FAA requires. The next Part identifies 
three areas where courts are deviating from state contract law and are 
over-enforcing arbitration clauses as a result.  
III. OVERRIDING STATE CONTRACT LAW 
This Article focuses on three specific areas where courts are distorting 
contract law by enforcing arbitration clauses that likely would not be 
enforced under ordinary contract principles. First, courts have applied the 
federal policy favoring arbitration to interpret ambiguous arbitration 
agreements in favor of arbitration instead of applying the longstanding 
contract doctrine of interpreting ambiguity against the party that drafted 
the agreement. Ambiguity in arbitration clauses can occur quite often, 
given that such clauses are typically placed in contracts of adhesion that 
leave no opportunity for bargaining or amendment. The two principles 
often collide because, particularly in consumer and employment cases, it is 
the drafter of the agreement that seeks to enforce the arbitration clause 
against the non-drafting party. Interpreting ambiguous contracts in favor 
of the drafter encourages manipulative and deliberately unclear arbitration 
clauses that will lead individuals to waive their rights in ways that they 
never realized when signing the underlying contract. 
Second, in addressing whether a party waived its right to enforce an 
arbitration clause, many (but not all) courts require a finding of prejudice 
to the opposing party and will refuse to find waiver in the absence of 
prejudice. This directly contravenes basic contract law, which establishes 
that waiver depends on the intent of the waiving party rather than on 
whether there is detrimental reliance by the opposing party. Such a rule 
creates bad policy by allowing parties to litigate their dispute and then 
subsequently turn to arbitration if it looks like they are not going to get the 
result they want in court.  
Third, courts have relied on the federal policy favoring arbitration to 
give non-signatories to the agreement a greater ability to enforce the 
agreement and compel arbitration of a dispute than they would have for 
other contracts. The result has been to blur the distinction between 
signatories and non-signatories by giving non-signatories many of the 
exact same rights under the agreement as signatories. That distinction is 
important because, understandably, contract law treats parties to a contract 
very differently from parties that have no connection to it. 
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A. Ambiguous Contracts 
Numerous courts, at both the state and federal level, have construed the 
policy favoring arbitration expansively so as to override the long-standing 
and well-settled contract rule that ambiguities in standard-form contractual 
terms should be interpreted against the drafting party.
107
 Known by its 
Latin formulation, contra proferentem,
108
 this doctrine is a 
well-established tenet of contract law.
109
 Although some authorities have 
said that the doctrine should be used as a “last resort” when extrinsic 
evidence fails to resolve the ambiguity,
110
 extrinsic evidence is often 
unavailable in arbitration disputes, and the doctrine has been frequently 
applied to standard-form contracts of all types.
111
  
Courts and commentators offer several sensible rationales for the 
doctrine.
112
 The main justification is that the rule encourages greater 
clarity in contracts through better drafting. If the party who drafts the 
contract runs the risk of losing when ambiguities arise, that party has an 
incentive to eliminate those ambiguities.
113
 Otherwise, drafting parties 
have the perverse incentive to write purposefully ambiguous contracts that 
they can exploit to their benefit and to the detriment of the non-drafting 
 
 
 107. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.  
 108. Contra proferentem is Latin for “against the offeror.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
 109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred 
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds.”); 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 68, § 32:12 (“Since the language is presumptively 
within the control of the party drafting the agreement, it is a generally accepted principle that any 
ambiguity . . . will be interpreted against the drafter.”). 
 110. See, e.g., 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 68, § 32:12 (“The rule of contra proferentem is 
generally said to be a rule of last resort and is applied only where other secondary rules of 
interpretation have failed to elucidate the contract’s meaning.”). 
 111. See, e.g., David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form 
Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 436 (2009) (asserting that contra proferentem has gone from 
being the last step in the interpretive process to the first while also indicating that the doctrine has been 
“on the wane”) (citing Shelby Cnty. State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F. 3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 
2002); see also 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 68, § 32:12 (“Indeed, any contract of adhesion, 
[which is] a contract entered without any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior bargaining 
power, is particularly susceptible to the rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 112. At the same time, the doctrine is not without critics. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Contra 
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1121–25 (2006) 
(disputing the rationale for contra proferentem); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and 
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 171 (1995) (arguing that a rule of interpreting ambiguities against the drafter in insurance 
contracts is inefficient and creates more costs than benefits). 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 206 cmt. a; Horton, supra note 111, at 459. 
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party.
114
 A second justification is that the rule operates as a “penalty 
default,”115 which requires the drafting party to reveal information about 
itself and its preferences through the inclusion of express terms rather than 
ambiguous ones.
116
 Third, the rule can be seen as serving a fairness 
function. It helps correct the imbalance stemming from the rise of 
contracts of adhesion in which the non-drafting party typically has inferior 
bargaining power and little or no ability to negotiate the terms of the 
agreement.
117
 
Although courts apply contra proferentem to all types of standard-form 
contracts, they treat arbitration agreements differently. While courts have 
split on the question, the majority has read Moses H. Cone’s policy 
favoring arbitration to trump the doctrine of contra proferentem and to 
require ambiguities to be interpreted in favor of arbitration, even if it is the 
drafting party that seeks to enforce the arbitration clause.
118
 
 
 
 114. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 111, at 476–78 (describing the incentives for “opportunistic 
ambiguity”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 206 cmt. a (noting the drafting party 
is “more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning” and may 
“leave meaning deliberately obscure”). 
 115. The “penalty default” theory of contracts was pioneered by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. 
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).  
 116. Horton, supra note 111, at 462–66; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of 
Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 475 (2011) (identifying a possible benefit of 
contra proferentem in “inducing the more knowledgeable party to reveal information through attempts 
to contract around the default”). 
 117. STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 188 (2009) (noting that the 
rule corrects for “an imbalance in the fairness of the exchange”); Horton, supra note 111, at 466–72; 
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1710, 1724 (1997) (stating that contra proferentem “may be justified on grounds of personal 
responsibility, fairness, efficiency, and redistribution”). 
 118. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Where the federal 
policy favoring arbitration is in tension with the tenet of contra proferentem for adhesion contracts, 
and there is a scope question at issue, the federal policy favoring arbitration trumps the state contract 
law tenet.”); McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981, 984–85 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating 
that doubts regarding the scope of an arbitration clause are resolved by the federal policy favoring 
arbitration rather than the state rule of “requiring that ambiguities in a document be resolved against 
the sophisticated drafter”); Arakelian v. N.C. Country Club Estates Ltd. P’ship, Civil Action No. 
08-5286, 2009 WL 4981479, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2009) (“In ordinary circumstances, North Carolina 
law specifies that ambiguity in contract language like that described above is construed against the 
drafter. Because, however, the ambiguity here occurs in the context of an arbitration clause, the 
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of arbitration.”) (citation omitted); Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans 
of Cal., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 84 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]lthough we might in other circumstances 
construe any uncertainty against . . . the drafting party, that principle is subordinate to the policy 
favoring arbitration when construing FAA agreements.”); Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 223 
Cal. Rptr. 838, 842 (Ct. App. 1986) (“It follows also then that ambiguities in an arbitration clause are 
to be resolved in favor of arbitration, notwithstanding the California rule that a contract is construed 
most strongly against the drafter.”) (citation omitted); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 378 n.3 (Colo. 
2003) (en banc) (“Although the court of appeals correctly stated that ambiguities in an insurance 
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Resolving ambiguities in favor of arbitration, instead of against the 
drafter, can make all the difference in determining whether a party loses its 
access to a judicial forum. Many arbitration clauses lack clarity as to 
whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of a mandatory 
arbitration provision.
119
 Those ambiguities now permit a drafting party to 
enforce an ambiguous arbitration clause even though, in almost every 
other contractual setting, the court would adopt a contrary interpretation of 
the contractual term. Indeed, courts often have found ambiguity to be 
dispositive, sending a dispute to arbitration precisely because the 
agreement was unclear as to whether the dispute belonged in arbitration.
120
 
 
 
contract generally are construed against the drafter, the court of appeals failed to recognize . . . that 
courts must afford ambiguities in arbitration agreements a presumption in favor of arbitration.”) 
(citations omitted); Blimpie Int’l, Inc. v. Choi, 822 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, ambiguities in an arbitration clause are to be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, notwithstanding the rule that a contract is construed most strongly against the drafter.”); 
Freeman v. Minolta Bus. Sys., Inc., 699 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that under the 
FAA ambiguities regarding the scope of an arbitration clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration, 
notwithstanding a state contract rule requiring ambiguities to be construed against the drafter); Gulf 
Ins. Co. v. Neel-Schaffer, Inc., 904 So. 2d 1036, 1049 (Miss. 2004) (“Based on clearly established 
federal law and our case law addressing arbitration issues, there is no doubt here that in those instances 
where this Court must interpret arbitration provisions, the doctrine of contra proferentem must 
succumb to the federal policy.”).  
 Other courts have continued to apply the doctrine of contra proferentem to arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding the federal policy favoring arbitration. However, those decisions appear to be 
primarily at the federal district court level, though a few state supreme courts have reached the same 
result. See, e.g., Mims v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (interpreting an ambiguous contract against the party seeking to enforce the arbitration clause); 
Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Civil Action No. 10-918, 2011 WL 93062, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 10, 2011) (applying Georgia law that ambiguous terms are construed against the drafter to 
conclude that the plaintiff was not a “Cardholder” under the arbitration agreement and therefore not 
bound to arbitrate); Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (“Notwithstanding the federal policy favoring arbitration, the rule of contra proferentem applies 
to arbitration clauses just as to other contractual terms.”); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 
973–74 (D.N.J. 1997) (relying in part on doctrine of contra proferentem to find that an ambiguous 
arbitration clause did not cover the dispute); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 
149, 156 (Del. 2002) (“The policy that favors alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
arbitration, does not trump basic principles of contract interpretation.”); Victoria v. Superior Court, 
710 P.2d 833, 838–40 (Cal. 1985) (In Bank) (resolving ambiguities in arbitration agreement against 
the drafter); Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 641 (Fla. 1999) (same); Luke v. Gentry 
Realty, Ltd., 96 P.3d 261, 269 (Haw. 2004) (same); Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 870 A.2d 146, 
150–52 (Me. 2005) (same); Union Planters Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 116, 120 (Miss. 
2005) (same).  
 119. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 59, 64 (statement of F. Paul Bland, Senior Attorney, Pub. 
Justice) (“I have seen hundreds of arbitration clauses, including clauses used by some of the largest 
and richest corporations in the United States, that are . . . cast in dense and cryptic legalese 
incomprehensible to lay persons (and even many lawyers) . . . .”); 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 
68, § 32:12 (noting that ambiguity “frequently occurs in the language used by the parties to express 
their meaning”). 
 120. See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 35–36 (holding that because the contract was ambiguous as to 
whether the arbitration clause applied retroactively to disputes arising before the clause went into 
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The policy of interpreting ambiguities in favor of arbitration also has 
been applied to other challenges to the applicability of an arbitration 
clause. One type of challenge involves Section 5 of the FAA, which 
governs when a substitute arbitrator can be appointed if the arbitrator 
designated in the agreement becomes unavailable, or when the 
unavailability means that the arbitration clause becomes unenforceable.
121
 
This seemingly mundane question has generated a large and growing 
amount of litigation, as many companies draft arbitration clauses to 
require arbitration in front of a single arbitration provider, usually because 
the company believes that the provider is more likely to rule in the 
company’s favor. One notable example involves the National Arbitration 
Forum (NAF), which until recently was one of the nation’s leading 
arbitration providers and the leading provider for arbitration of 
debt-collection matters.
122
 Many arbitration clauses require arbitration in 
front of NAF, and, as revealed in a lawsuit brought by the state of 
Minnesota, NAF was riddled with conflicts of interest that caused it to 
systematically favor companies over individuals in resolving 
arbitrations.
123
 NAF settled the lawsuit by agreeing to not accept any new 
 
 
effect, the dispute must be sent to arbitration); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 
(10th Cir. 1995) (“Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the February 1992 version of the Code (or 
perhaps more correctly, because of such ambiguity), we conclude that the most appropriate 
construction of the February 1992 Code is to apply its arbitration provisions to employment disputes 
involving these Plaintiffs.”); Arakelian, Civil Action No. 08-5286, 2009 WL 4981479, at *9 
(acknowledging ambiguity regarding whether defendant could enforce arbitration clause and relying 
on ambiguity to send the dispute to arbitration); Erickson, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84 (acknowledging 
ambiguity and requiring arbitration as a result); Allen, 71 P.3d at 381 (finding that a non-signatory who 
was a spouse of a signatory was required to arbitrate a wrongful death dispute where the contract 
bound the signatory’s “heirs” to arbitration and was ambiguous as to whether a spouse was an heir); 
see also Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1996) (relying on the federal policy 
favoring arbitration to send dispute to arbitration even though the arbitration clause “could have been 
drafted with more precision”); cf. McKee, 45 F.3d at 984–85 (construing ambiguity in agreement as to 
whether arbitration would be binding or non-binding to require binding arbitration). 
 121. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or 
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method 
be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such 
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or 
umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court 
shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act 
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named 
therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single 
arbitrator.”). 
 122. See Brief of National Consumer Law Center & Consumer Action as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 7, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 
WL 1410709 [hereinafter Brief of National Consumer Law Center]. 
 123. See Complaint, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
July 14, 2009); Consent Judgment, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. 
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arbitrations or influence any of its pending arbitrations.
124
 Litigation has 
ensued over whether clauses requiring arbitration in front of NAF can be 
enforced by substituting a new arbitrator.  
Although litigation in this area is still emerging, courts generally will 
agree to substitute a new arbitrator unless they find that the contract’s 
designation of a specific arbitrator was “integral” to the agreement.125 
However, answering that question necessarily requires the court to make a 
subjective judgment, and a contract rarely will specify whether the 
designation of a particular arbitrator is integral. Thus, the contract will 
almost always be silent or ambiguous on the question, and some courts 
have relied on that ambiguity to permit substitution of a new arbitrator and 
hence enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
126
 
This extension of the federal policy favoring arbitration by lower courts 
is incorrect and is not compelled by Moses H. Cone. No doctrinal basis 
exists for overriding the general rule of contra proferentem and for 
sending disputes to arbitration when it is not clear that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate a particular dispute. Indeed, the drafters of the FAA emphasized 
that they intended to preserve the defense that the parties did not agree to 
arbitrate a particular dispute, and there is no indication that the drafters 
intended for the Act to place any limits or restrictions on that defense.
127
  
Nor has the Supreme Court itself always required arbitration in the 
presence of ambiguity. For example, the Court has held that the question 
of an arbitration clause’s enforceability can be resolved in arbitration only 
when the arbitration clause contains “clear and unmistakable” language 
delegating that question to the arbitrator.
128
 Similarly, the Court recently 
 
 
Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009). For a discussion of NAF’s biased practices in favor of companies over 
consumers, see Brief of National Consumer Law Center, supra note 122, at 5–18.  
 124. See Consent Judgment ¶ 3, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550. 
 125. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. 
Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). An arbitrator would be “integral” if the agreement 
reflected the parties’ intent to arbitrate before a particular person or entity, rather than an intent to 
arbitrate generally. See, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d at 354. 
 126. See, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d at 356 (relying on the federal policy favoring arbitration to decide 
that ambiguity as to whether the contract’s designation of NAF was “integral” requires enforcement of 
the arbitration clause). 
 127. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 31, at 271 (“At the outset the party who has refused to arbitrate 
because he believes in good faith that his agreement does not bind him to arbitrate, or that the 
agreement is not applicable to the controversy, is protected by the provision of the law which requires 
the court to examine into the merits of such a claim.”). But cf. id. at 274–75 n.20 (asserting that 
arbitration agreements should be construed liberally). 
 128. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. 
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). In First Options, the Court held that the FAA 
“reverses the presumption” favoring arbitration when it comes to the question of who decides whether 
a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause. Id. at 945. The Court did not explain how the 
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interpreted an arbitration agreement’s silence on the availability of 
classwide arbitration to mean that classwide arbitration ordinarily is 
unauthorized, even if that leads to less arbitration as a result.
129
 Thus, 
Moses H. Cone does not give lower courts carte blanche to ignore general 
contract principles regarding interpretation of ambiguous agreements. 
Moreover, overriding the rule of contra proferentem in the arbitration 
context makes for bad policy. First, it encourages manipulative behavior 
by entities that use arbitration clauses in their standard-form agreements. 
They have every incentive to make those clauses increasingly vague as to 
which disputes require arbitration, with the knowledge that if the clause is 
ambiguous, courts will require arbitration, even if the non-drafting party 
would not have reasonably anticipated that such disputes would be 
covered by the clause.
130
  
There appears to be some evidence, particularly in the consumer 
context, that companies intentionally make their arbitration clauses 
difficult to understand so that consumers will not fully realize what rights 
they are giving up. For example, an expert on readability analyzed the 
arbitration agreements of several payday loan companies
131
 and found that 
(a) “the vast majority of Americans would have difficulty comprehending 
the [companies’] arbitration agreements,” (b) a reader would require a 
college-level education to understand them, (c) the companies used terms 
that were undefined and did not appear in conventional dictionaries, and 
(d) the companies used sentences so long (including a 288-word sentence) 
as to render them “essentially not comprehensible.”132 By contrast, the text 
that the companies used on their websites to solicit loan business and 
market their products was written in much simpler language that was “far 
easier to read” than the language in the arbitration agreement.133 This 
discrepancy suggests that companies know how to make themselves 
 
 
law reverses that presumption with any greater clarity than it explained in Moses H. Cone why there is 
a federal policy favoring arbitration in the first place. Rather, it simply declared that “the law treats 
silence or ambiguity about the question who (primarily) should decide arbitrability differently from the 
way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question whether a particular merits-related dispute is 
arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.” Id. at 944–45 (quotation 
marks omitted). But see Cunningham, supra note 16, at 136–38 (critiquing the First Options decision). 
 129. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 130. Cf. Sternlight, supra note 70, at 35 n.125 (asserting that “drafters of the clause can use their 
superior knowledge to draft a clause that places them at a great advantage”). 
 131. “A payday loan is a loan of short duration, typically two weeks, at an astronomical annual 
interest rate . . . .” Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F.3d 775, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 132. Affidavit of Beth Weir, ¶¶ 20, 38, McQuillan v. Check ‘N Go of N.C., Inc., Case No. 
04-CVS-2858 (N.C. Sup. Ct., Aug. 5, 2005). 
 133. See id., ¶ 18. 
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understood and how to make themselves difficult to understand. When it 
comes to arbitration clauses, they prefer the latter to the former. 
Second, overriding the contra proferentem doctrine undermines the 
fairness and distributive justice concerns that the doctrine protects. Contra 
proferentem is particularly suited to arbitration clauses,
134
 which are often 
placed in standard-form contracts between companies that are repeat 
players in alternative dispute resolution and unsophisticated consumers 
and employees who have no opportunity to bargain over contract terms. 
Because contra proferentem was designed to protect unsophisticated 
parties lacking in bargaining power, the doctrine fits well with the 
legislative history of the FAA suggesting that the Act was intended only 
for disputes between sophisticated commercial parties.
135
 Additionally, 
fairness concerns would appear to apply with particular strength when the 
issue is a party’s waiver of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a 
judicial forum. Interpreting ambiguities against the party drafting the 
arbitration clause is consistent with the general rule requiring a clear 
statement that a party intended to waive its Seventh Amendment rights.
136
 
In fact, the rule of contra proferentem plays an even more important 
role in arbitration than it does in other contexts, because other efforts that 
state legislatures or courts may take to promote clarity in arbitration 
agreements are likely to be preempted by the FAA on the ground that they 
disfavor arbitration. For example, the Supreme Court has found that a state 
statute which required that “[n]otice that a contract is subject to 
arbitration” be “typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the 
contract” in order to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity was preempted.137 
Additionally, although contra proferentem often works in tandem with the 
 
 
 134. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the fairness concerns underlying the contra 
proferentem doctrine apply to arbitration clauses. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
514 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1995) (interpreting an ambiguous arbitration clause against the drafter so as to 
permit the arbitrator to award punitive damages and noting that the purposes of contra proferentem 
were “well suited to the facts of this case”). 
 135. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 136. For a more detailed discussion of the tension between judicial interpretation of the FAA and 
judicial interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding 
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 669 (2001). 
 137. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684, 687 (1996). Presumably, rules 
requiring greater clarity in all contracts, rather than just arbitration agreements, would not be 
preempted. However, courts often have found that statutes or rules that are not limited to arbitration 
are preempted. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
FAA preempts the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, which made “‘unenforceable and void’ 
any waiver by a consumer of the statutory rights provided for” under the Act) (citing Am. Online, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 707 (2001)). 
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doctrine of unconscionability to protect fairness in the contracting 
process,
138
 unconscionability defenses are not always available in 
arbitrability disputes. The Supreme Court has found that certain 
unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses are preempted by the 
FAA
139
 and that other unconscionability challenges must be resolved in 
arbitration rather than in court.
140
 Thus, unlike with other contracts, contra 
proferentem may be one of the only ways to protect against unfair 
arbitration agreements. Taking that doctrine away as well, as many courts 
have done, simply undermines the fairness of the arbitration process. 
As a result, interpreting ambiguous arbitration clauses in favor of 
arbitration, which often means interpreting the clause in favor of the 
drafter, is both inconsistent with the purpose of the FAA and poor policy. 
In what is already a situation of unequal bargaining power between 
individuals and corporations, a broad reading of the federal policy 
favoring arbitration takes one more protection away from the side of the 
transaction that needs it most. 
B. Waiver 
A second area where courts have departed from traditional contract-law 
principles in order to favor arbitration agreements concerns whether a 
party has waived its right to enforce an arbitration clause. Waiver 
ordinarily results when a party fails to demand arbitration of a dispute, 
chooses instead to participate in litigation, and later decides that it wants to 
enforce the arbitration clause. In determining whether a waiver has 
occurred, the majority of courts have tacked on an extra requirement—that 
the party arguing for waiver shows that it was prejudiced by the opposing 
party’s conduct, even though prejudice is not required to establish waiver 
of other contractual terms. As a consequence, courts have over-enforced 
arbitration clauses by submitting disputes to arbitration even where one 
party has knowingly acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Just as 
with ambiguous arbitration clauses, this creates bad policy by encouraging 
strategic behavior.  
The consequences of erecting greater hurdles for finding waiver of 
arbitration agreements than for other contracts are significant because 
 
 
 138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (comparing the application of 
contra proferentem to the refusal to enforce “an unconscionable clause”). 
 139. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the FAA 
preempts state law that invalidated classwide bans in arbitration clauses as unconscionable). 
 140. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (sending a dispute over 
unconscionability of an arbitration clause to the arbitrator to decide). 
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disputes over waiver are litigated with surprising frequency.
141
 When 
waiver questions are litigated, the prejudice requirement often is 
determinative in deciding whether or not a waiver occurred.
142
 
Additionally, the prejudice requirement has become a hot litigation topic. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to determine whether 
prejudice is required for an arbitration waiver, but the case was dismissed 
after the parties settled.
143
  
Waiver of an arbitration clause, just like waiver of any other contract 
provision, is a contractual question.
144
 As a general contract matter, a 
waiver requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
145
 Courts 
are reluctant to find contractual waivers and generally recognize a 
presumption against waiver.
146
 At the same time, a foundational and 
long-standing principle of waiver is that waiver does not require prejudice 
to the opposing party.
147
 Prejudice typically means that the opposing party 
relies on the waiver in some way and consequently suffers harm when the 
waiving party changes its mind and attempts to enforce the contract.
148
 In 
the arbitration context, courts generally define prejudice in two ways. 
Substantive prejudice occurs where a party tries to litigate the same issue 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., James W. Davis, When Does a Party Waive Its Right to Enforce Arbitration?, 63 
ALA. LAW. 42, 43 (2002) (“[O]ne would think that in every case where an arbitration clause is present, 
at least one of the parties would immediately locate and seek to enforce the agreement. However, there 
are a surprising number of reported cases in which a party is accused of waiving its right to arbitration 
because of delay in asserting that right.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 702 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“The dispositive determination is whether the opposing party has suffered actual prejudice.”); Ehleiter 
v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “prejudice is the touchstone 
for determining whether the right to arbitrate has been waived”) (quotation marks omitted); Miller 
Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[P]rejudice . . . is the 
essence of waiver.”); Sentry Eng’g & Constr., Inc. v. Mariner’s Cay Dev. Corp., 338 S.E.2d 631, 634 
(S.C. 1985) (“[I]t is not inconsistency, but the presence or absence of prejudice which is 
determinative.”). 
 143. Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011) (granting certiorari); Stok & 
Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 2955 (2011) (dismissing case following settlement). 
 144. See, e.g., Welborn Clinic v. Medquist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Like any 
other contractual right, the right to arbitrate a claim may be waived.”); Burton-Dixie Corp. v. Timothy 
McCarthy Constr. Co., 436 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1971) (“It is well established that agreements to 
submit disputes to . . . arbitrators, just like any other contract terms, may be waived.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077 n.12 (Fla. 2001) 
(defining waiver as “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, or conduct which 
implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right”); accord RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONTRACTS, § 84, cmt. b (1981) (defining waiver and distinguishing waiver from estoppel).  
 146. See, e.g., Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v. Tocqueville Asset Mgmt., L.P., 850 N.E.2d 
653, 658 (N.Y. 2006). 
 147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (9th ed. 2009) (defining prejudice as “[d]amage 
or detriment to one's legal rights or claims”). 
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twice in both court and arbitration, and economic prejudice occurs when a 
party’s decision to seek arbitration after invoking the litigation process 
forces the opposing party to experience unnecessary delay or expense.
149
 
The reason that prejudice is not required for a general contract waiver 
is that waiver is based solely on the intent and conduct of the party who is 
waiving the contractual right at issue. It does not depend on the effect of 
that party’s conduct on the other parties to the contract.150 As a result, an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right will, as it should, give rise to a 
waiver even if the opposing party is not prejudiced. Instead, prejudice, or 
detrimental reliance, is an element of an entirely different doctrine—
estoppel, which looks to the effect on the opposing party regardless of the 
intent of the waiving party.
151
 
When it comes to arbitration agreements, however, many courts treat 
waiver differently than in other contracts. Not only do courts require a 
party to act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate—say, by instituting or 
participating in litigation rather than seeking to compel arbitration—but 
the vast majority of courts also require prejudice.
152
 In other words, it is 
 
 
 149. See, e.g., Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., S.A., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 150. See, e.g., Pitts v. Am. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Strictly defined, 
waiver describes the act, or the consequences of the act, of one party only, while estoppel exists when 
the conduct of one party has induced the other party to take a position that would result in harm if the 
first party’s act were repudiated.”); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(“[N]o detriment to a third party is required for waiver, it is unilaterally accomplished.”); City of 
Glendale v. Coquat, 52 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Ariz. 1935) (“[W]aiver depends upon what one himself 
intends to do, regardless of the attitude assumed by the other party . . . . Waiver does not necessarily 
imply that the other party has been misled to his prejudice . . . .”); Nathan Miller, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co. of 
N.Y., 39 A.2d 23, 25 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944) (“[Waiver] depends on what one party intended to do, 
rather than upon what he induced his adversary to do, as in estoppel. The doctrine does not necessarily 
imply that one party to the controversy has been misled to his detriment in reliance on the conduct of 
the other party . . . .”); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 353 (Haw. 1996) (“Waiver 
is essentially unilateral in character, focusing only upon the acts and conduct of the insurer. 
Prejudice . . . or detrimental reliance is not required.”) (citing Salloum Foods & Liquor, Inc. v. 
Parliament Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 23, 27–28 (1979)); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 
S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. 1989) (En Banc); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel & Waiver, § 35 (2011) (“The intent 
to relinquish a right is a necessary element of waiver but not of estoppel while detrimental reliance is a 
necessary element of estoppel but not of waiver.”); see also Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid 
Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n ordinary contract law, a waiver normally is 
effective without proof of consideration or detrimental reliance.”) (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1990); 3A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 753 (1960)). 
 151. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel & Waiver, § 35 (“The intent to relinquish a right is a necessary 
element of waiver but not of estoppel while detrimental reliance is a necessary element of estoppel but 
not of waiver.”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983); 
see also infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2007); Ehleiter 
v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 223 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 
41, 44 (1st Cir. 2005); Republic Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 
2004); Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 2004); 
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not enough for a party to act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. It 
must also do so in a way that materially harms the opposing party. Many 
of the courts that require prejudice have explicitly stated that this extra 
burden derives from the federal policy favoring arbitration and exists as a 
matter of federal law irrespective of whether state contract law requires 
prejudice.
153
 Thus, courts have created a federal law of arbitration waiver 
that differs from and is more onerous than the waiver standard for 
contracts generally. 
The imposition of this additional element is consequential. To be sure, 
there are many cases in which a party’s litigation conduct, such as 
participating in discovery or filing a motion for summary judgment, will 
cause prejudice. But there are also numerous cases in which courts have 
refused to find waiver, notwithstanding that a party acted inconsistently 
with the right to arbitrate, because they determined that the opposing party 
 
 
O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 355–56 (6th Cir. 2003); Thyssen, 310 F.3d at 
105; United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2002); Ivax Corp. v. B. 
Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2002); Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Whitesell 
Mfg., Inc., 670 So. 2d 897, 899 (Ala. 1995); In re Noel R. Shahan Irrevocable & Inter Vivos Trust, 
932 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Saint Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal., 82 P.3d 727, 
738 (Cal. 2003); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 372 (Conn. 1995) (following federal law); 
Wesley Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22, 30 (Iowa 1999); Rauscher Pierce 
Refsnes, Inc. v. Flatt, 632 So. 2d 807, 810 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (following federal law); Hughes v. 
Lund, 603 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Mueller v. Hopkins & Howard, P.C., 5 S.W.3d 
182, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Good Samaritan Coffee Co. v. LaRue Distrib., Inc., 748 N.W.2d 367, 
375 (Neb. 2008) (following federal law); Nev. Gold & Casinos, Inc. v. Am. Heritage, Inc., 110 P.3d 
481, 485 (Nev. 2005); Bd. of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. Architects, Taos, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (N.M. 
1985); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 677 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (App. Div. 1998) (following federal law); 
Sturm v. Schamens, 392 S.E.2d 432, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Hawkins, 964 P.2d 
291, 292 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (following federal law); Rich v. Walsh, 590 S.E.2d 506, 509–10 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2003) (following federal law); Tjeerdsma v. Global Steel Bldgs., Inc., 466 N.W.2d 643, 645 
(S.D. 1991) (following federal law); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 593–95 (Tex. 2008); 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 359–60 (Utah 1992); Jackson State Bank v. 
Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wyo. 1992).  
 Only a handful of courts have held that prejudice is not required. See, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., 50 
F.3d at 388; Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994); 
Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005); Conseco Fin. Servicing 
Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Blackburn v. Citifinancial, Inc., No. 
05AP-733, 2007 WL 927222, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 153. See, e.g., Thyssen, 310 F.3d at 104–05 (explaining that because of the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, waiver “is not to be lightly inferred,” and that the “key to a waiver analysis is prejudice”); 
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “in light of the 
federal policy favoring arbitration,” the circumstances giving rise to waiver “are not to be lightly 
inferred”) (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir.1985)); see also 
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 6 cmt. 5 (2000) (“However, because of the public policy favoring 
arbitration, a court normally will only find waiver of a right to arbitrate where a party claiming waiver 
meets the burden of proving that the waiver has caused prejudice.”). 
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did not suffer sufficient prejudice.
154
 For example, while failing to seek to 
compel arbitration after a party initiates litigation is inconsistent with the 
right to arbitrate, courts have stressed that delay in seeking to enforce 
arbitration rights is not prejudicial.
155
 Thus, courts have permitted parties 
who had litigated a dispute in court for months or even years to change 
their mind and seek arbitration.
156
 Courts also have found that putting an 
opposing party through the time and expense of discovery was not 
sufficiently prejudicial to give rise to waiver.
157
 Other courts have held 
that substantial litigation conduct, such as filing a complaint, 
counterclaim, or crossclaim, did not, on its own, constitute prejudice and 
was insufficient to prevent the party from changing its mind and seeking 
arbitration.
158
 
The problem with requiring prejudice is that it imposes additional 
burdens on parties opposing arbitration that are not present in traditional 
contract law. First, while a party may lose the right to enforce an ordinary 
contractual term either by virtue of the party’s intent (waiver) or by virtue 
 
 
 154. See, e.g., Dumont v. Sask. Gov’t Ins., 258 F.3d 880, 886–87 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding no 
waiver based on defendant’s motion to dismiss, which referred to intent to seek arbitration); Walker v. 
J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that defendant’s thirteen-month delay, 
during which it removed the case to federal court and served interrogatories on plaintiffs, did not 
establish waiver); Reidy v. Cyberonics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-249, 2007 WL 496679, at *7 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 8, 2007) (“[T]hough Defendant removed this case to federal court, filed an answer, and engaged 
in discovery, Defendant’s actions do not rise to the level of substantial participation in litigation . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted); Harsco Corp. v. Crane Carrier Co., 701 N.E.2d 1040 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
no waiver where an answer was filed and limited discovery and depositions took place); In re 
Medallion, Ltd., 70 S.W.3d 284 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that limited discovery, participation in 
mediation, and entering into an agreed order regarding the existence of a settlement were not sufficient 
to support a finding of waiver). 
 155. See, e.g., Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 703 (4th Cir. 
2012); Saga Commc’ns of New England, Inc. v. Voornas, 756 A.2d 954, 961 (Me. 2000); Major 
Cadillac, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 280 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 156. See, e.g., Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, AG, 770 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1985); Am. 
Gen. Home Equity, Inc. v. Kestel, 253 S.W.3d 543, 553–56 (Ky. 2008) (holding that months of 
litigation conduct, including defending motions and filing answers, did not constitute waiver where the 
party consistently mentioned in its papers that the case “may be subject to arbitration”).  
 157. See, e.g., Rota-McLarty, 700 F.3d 690 (finding that the taking of discovery, including a 
deposition of the plaintiff, was not prejudicial); Keytrade USA, Inc. v. Ain Temouchent M/V, 404 F.3d 
891, 898 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that discovery would not cause prejudice as long as the party does 
not “shower” the opposing party with discovery requests); McFadden v. Clarkeson Research Grp., 
Inc., No. CV 09-0112, 2010 WL 2076001, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010) (finding no waiver where 
limited discovery requests did not result in prejudice).  
 158. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 661–62 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(counterclaim); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (no waiver 
based on simply initiating suit because party seeking waiver had not “engage[d] in protracted litigation 
that results in prejudice to the opposing party”) (citing S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 
Inc., 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir 1998)); Toler’s Cove Homeowners Ass’n v. Trident Constr. Co., 586 
S.E.2d 581, 585 (S.C. 2003) (third-party complaint). 
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of causing prejudice to the opposing party (estoppel), waiver of an 
arbitration right requires both. Requiring both elements in the arbitration 
context—an intent to act inconsistently with the right to arbitrate as well 
as prejudice—combines the elements of waiver and estoppel into a single 
doctrine, thus erecting two hurdles to finding a waiver rather than one.
159
 
By making it easier for a party to avoid waiver of an arbitration clause 
than to avoid waiver of other contractual provisions, courts have given 
arbitration clauses special and unwarranted status. 
Second, engrafting a prejudice requirement into the waiver analysis 
also contravenes general contract law by making waivers presumptively 
revocable. According to the standard for waiver in arbitration agreements, 
a party can intentionally relinquish its right to arbitrate by participating in 
litigation and then voluntarily retract that waiver as long as the opposing 
party was not prejudiced. The general rule, however, is that a waiver is 
irrevocable without consent from the opposing party.
160
 
Third, making waiver more difficult to establish in the arbitration 
context than in other contexts is particularly unsettling in light of the 
willingness of courts to utilize the federal policy favoring arbitration in 
order to indulge a presumption in favor of finding a waiver of one’s 
 
 
 159. To be sure, one could argue that estoppel, rather than waiver, is the proper framework and 
that as a result prejudice should be required. Acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate—say, by 
waiting until after the onset of litigation to seek arbitration—may not always reveal a deliberate intent 
to forgo arbitration as much as inadvertence or oversight. Rather, acting inconsistently with the right to 
arbitrate might more closely approximate action giving rise to an estoppel, namely, action that sends 
an improper message to the opposing party and causes harm when it induces detrimental reliance by 
that party. Despite its surface appeal, that argument is unpersuasive. As many courts recognize, where 
a party knows that it has signed an arbitration clause and nonetheless takes actions inconsistent with 
the right to arbitrate, it is a reasonable inference that it is intentionally waiving its arbitration rights. 
See, e.g., Se. Stud & Components, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Design Build Studios, LLC, 588 F.3d 963 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that it was unaware of its right to arbitrate until another 
case was decided); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390–91 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (explaining that acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate ordinarily indicates an intent 
to relinquish one’s arbitration rights); AZ Holding, L.L.C. v. Frederick, No. CV-08-0276-PHX-LOA, 
2010 WL 500443 at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2010) (finding constructive knowledge of arbitration clause 
where defendants signed clause and clause was prepared by law firm that represented defendants). In 
the unusual situation where knowledge plus inconsistent action does not compel an inference of intent, 
courts can look at prejudice—but are not required to do so—as a way of evaluating whether a party 
should lose its right to demand arbitration. See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91. That view seems more 
consistent with traditional contract principles than the view that prejudice is always required, even if 
there is evidence of an intent to forego arbitration. 
 160. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 937 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 
1991); First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045, 1064 (11th Cir. 
1990) (“The fact that a subsequent letter . . . contains nonwaiver language does not work to reverse the 
waiver because a waiver is irrevocable and cannot be recalled.”); State ex rel. Johnson v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 810, Wabasha Cnty., 109 N.W.2d 596, 602 (Minn. 1961) (holding that a waiver, “when once 
established . . . is irrevocable even in the absence of consideration therefor”). 
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judicial rights. Arbitration is itself a type of contractual waiver, and the 
ease with which courts find that parties waived their right to go to court 
contrasts sharply with their reluctance to find that parties waived their 
right to arbitrate.  
In addition to departing from the general principles of contract law that 
the FAA was supposed to incorporate, requiring prejudice makes bad 
policy by encouraging strategic behavior and reducing efficiency. First, 
erecting additional burdens to finding waiver promotes gamesmanship and 
encourages parties to seek two bites at the apple. If waiver will not occur 
in the absence of prejudice, parties have greater freedom to test the waters 
in litigation, and then, if it looks like they will receive an adverse result, 
they can turn around and seek to compel arbitration. This is particularly 
true given that courts have held that filing certain dispositive motions such 
as a motion to dismiss is not inherently prejudicial.
161
 Thus a party can 
seek to dismiss an action in court, and if the motion is granted they win. If 
the motion is denied, then the party can usually try again in arbitration. 
This creates, in the words of one court, a “heads I win, tails you lose” 
situation.
162
 
The prejudice requirement is particularly unsuitable for arbitration 
because one of the primary motivations of the FAA’s drafters was to stop 
this kind of strategic behavior. Several of the FAA’s drafters lamented that 
because pre-FAA courts would refuse to require specific performance of 
arbitration clauses, parties could “back out” of arbitration “at the last 
moment when they see the case is going against them.”163 Yet, the 
imposition of a prejudice requirement gives parties greater leeway to 
“back out” of litigation if they know that their inconsistent conduct will 
not necessarily give rise to a waiver. 
Second, requiring prejudice undermines the speed and efficiency goals 
that arbitration seeks to promote. One reason that Congress passed the 
 
 
 161. Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no waiver 
based on defendant’s motion to dismiss second amended complaint when plaintiff failed to show 
prejudice); Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, 333 F. Supp. 2d 318, 325–26 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding 
that ten-month delay and ruling on a motion to dismiss that did not address the merits did not 
constitute waiver); Redemptorists v. Coulthard Servs., Inc., 801 A.2d 1104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) 
(holding that filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was not a waiver of arbitration). 
 162. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391. 
 163. Joint Hearings, supra note 27, at 5, 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, 
Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of N.Y.); accord id. at 33, 35 (written 
statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, ABA) (emphasizing that “a party has been at absolute 
liberty to disregard his engagement to enter into arbitration at any time before the award actually is 
handed down” and that a party will change their mind about arbitrating when that party “sees an 
advantage in the delay and trouble to which his opponent will be put to enforce his rights through the 
courts”). 
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FAA was to provide a faster and cheaper alternative to litigation.
164
 
Allowing parties to delay enforcing their arbitration rights, or to litigate 
first and then arbitrate, slows down the process rather than speeding it up. 
It also increases costs by having the same issues addressed both in court 
and in arbitration.
165
 Thus, while courts have derived the prejudice 
requirement from the federal policy favoring arbitration, the rule is not 
only inconsistent with the FAA’s goal of treating arbitration clauses like 
other contracts, it also makes alternative dispute resolution a more costly 
and less efficient process. The way in which courts have used the federal 
policy favoring arbitration to shield arbitration clauses from challenge 
shows just how much the Court’s statements in Moses H. Cone have 
twisted the FAA away from its original purpose of incorporating, rather 
than overriding, state contract law.  
C. Non-Signatories 
A third area in which the law of arbitration has deviated from 
traditional contract law concerns the situation where parties that did not 
sign an arbitration agreement nonetheless can enforce it against a signatory 
to the agreement. Attempts by non-signatories to attach themselves to a 
contract and to force arbitration of a dispute arise frequently and are a 
fertile source of litigation.
166
 In this area, courts purport to apply 
traditional common-law rules of contract and agency in determining the 
rights of non-signatories, but in actuality they have given non-signatories 
greater rights to enforce arbitration clauses than other contractual 
provisions. The result is that a party can be forced to arbitrate a dispute 
with an entity that was not a party to the arbitration agreement and never 
signed it, and in situations where there was never any express 
understanding that the entity would have a right to demand arbitration.  
Courts are fond of pointing out that “arbitration is a matter of 
contract.”167 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[i]t goes without 
 
 
 164. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that the FAA will allow parties to avoid “the 
delay and expense of litigation”). 
 165. 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 71, § 21.3.3 (arguing that “[t]he requirement of prejudice, 
particularly in courts loathe to find prejudice, protects the federal contract right to arbitrate at 
considerable cost to efficiency”). 
 166. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 211–12 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the frequency with which non-signatory parties seek to force another party into 
arbitration.  
 167. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)).  
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saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty,”168 and courts have 
recognized that, as a general matter, non-signatories are neither bound by 
nor entitled to enforce an arbitration agreement.
169
 At the same time, 
general principles of contract and agency law allow non-parties to a 
contract to enforce it in certain circumstances. These circumstances 
include incorporation by reference, alter ego, equitable estoppel, 
third-party beneficiary, and agency.
170
 The following Sections discuss two 
of those doctrines: agency and equitable estoppel. 
While the above principles are consistent with general contract law, the 
way in which courts have applied them to arbitration agreements is not. 
While purporting to remain faithful to traditional contract and agency 
principles, courts have interpreted certain doctrines broadly to give 
non-signatories expanded rights to enforce arbitration clauses, and have 
relied on the federal policy favoring arbitration in doing so.
171
 It is possible 
that courts might give less weight to the federal policy favoring arbitration 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, in which the Court suggested in dicta that a non-signatory can 
enforce an arbitration clause “if the relevant state contract law allows him” 
 
 
 168. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002).  
 169. See, e.g., Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2003) (“In order 
to be subject to arbitral jurisdiction, a party must generally be a signatory to a contract containing an 
arbitration clause.”).  
 170. See, e.g., Mundi v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009); Bridas, 
345 F.3d at 356; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, 
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 171. Several courts have stated that the federal policy applies in determining whether a particular 
issue is arbitrable, but not to whether a particular party is subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Becker v. 
Davis, 491 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007); Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.11 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The question here is not whether a particular issue is arbitrable, but whether a particular party 
is bound by the arbitration agreement. Under these circumstances, the liberal federal policy regarding 
the scope of arbitrable issues is inapposite.”); Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 
1073 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply the policy favoring arbitration to determine whether a party 
was bound by the arbitration clause); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The 
federal policy, however, does not extend to situations in which the identity of the parties who have 
agreed to arbitrate is unclear.”); Cnty. of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 628, 633 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Even the strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to 
those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement . . . .”); Slusher v. Ohio Valley Propane Servs., 
896 N.E.2d 715, 723 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (“Thus, the principle favoring arbitration does not apply 
when there is a question as to whether the parties before the court are the same as the parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate.”) (citing West v. Household Life Ins. Co., 867 N.E.2d 868, 872 ¶ 11 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2007)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lockey Inv. Grp., L.L.C., 195 S.W.3d 
807, 817 (Tex. App. 2006) (“[T]he strong presumption favoring arbitration does not arise until a 
person seeking to compel arbitration proves that a valid arbitration agreement exists.”); Bybee v. 
Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 48 (Utah 2008). Nonetheless, as explained in this Part, although courts may 
state that the federal policy does not apply, the federal policy favoring arbitration substantially 
influences the reasoning of courts that have granted non-signatories broad rights to enforce arbitration 
agreements.  
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to do so.
172
 While some courts have relied on Carlisle in addressing 
non-signatory questions, they usually have done so only to determine 
whether a non-signatory’s ability to enforce an arbitration clause is a 
question of state law or federal law.
173
 But as the following Sections 
explain, even where courts claim to apply state law, they in fact deviate 
from it and give arbitration agreements special treatment not afforded to 
other contracts. 
1. Agency 
Courts have extended the federal policy favoring arbitration to give 
non-signatory agents broad authority to enforce arbitration clauses that 
they did not sign or that they signed on behalf of their principals. By 
contrast, general principles of agency law do not give an agent a right to 
enforce a contract signed by the agent on behalf of the principal. 
Agency questions surface in a number of contexts. They often arise 
when employees of a company are sued for misconduct and attempt to rely 
on an arbitration clause signed by the plaintiff and the company to force 
the dispute to arbitration.
174
 They also commonly arise in cases where the 
holder of a debt sells the claim to a debt collector that then gets sued for 
engaging in harassing or unlawful conduct,
175
 and in cases involving 
patient abuse at nursing homes, where the patient does not sign the 
admission agreement (which contains the arbitration clause), but a family 
member does.
176
  
The following is a typical example of an agency problem arising in an 
arbitration context. A customer buys an automobile based on the 
 
 
 172. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 632 (2009) (distinguishing between the issue 
of whether an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is appealable, a question of federal law, 
from the question of whether a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration clause, a question of state 
contract law).  
 173. See, e.g., Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Wholesale Grocery 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 707 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[S]tate contract law governs the ability of 
nonsignatories to enforce arbitration provisions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kramer v. 
Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013); Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 449 Fed. Appx. 704, 708–09 (10th Cir. 2011); Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., 648 
F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (11th Cir. 2011) (clarifying that Carlisle establishes that state law determines 
when a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration clause); Donaldson Co. v. Burroughs Diesel, Inc., 581 
F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2009) (same). Other courts have disagreed over whether federal law or state 
law controls this question. See, e.g., Graves v. BP Am., Inc., 568 F.3d 221, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(acknowledging competing approaches regarding whether to apply federal law or state law). 
 174. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 175. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 7.5.3 at 260–62. 
 176. See id. § 7.5.4 at 262–66. 
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representation of a salesperson about the vehicle’s condition.177 When 
purchasing the vehicle, the customer signs a purchase contract containing 
an arbitration clause requiring her to resolve all disputes with the 
dealership in arbitration. An agent of the dealership signs the contract on 
behalf of the dealership. The customer subsequently learns that the 
salesperson falsely represented the vehicle’s condition and sues the 
salesperson and the insurance company under the tort theory of fraudulent 
inducement. The salesperson then seeks to compel arbitration of the claim 
against him, even though the salesperson either did not sign the purchase 
contract with the arbitration clause, or did so in his capacity as an agent of 
the dealership. 
Under general agency law principles, the salesperson would not be 
permitted to enforce the arbitration clause. Although an agent’s signature 
on behalf of the principal binds the principal to the contract, it does not 
confer any rights on the agent. The agent is not a party to the contract and 
can neither enforce it nor be bound by it.
178
 As a result, “the agent should 
not be able to assert rights as an individual derived from the contract in the 
absence of indicia that the parties to the contract so intended.”179 This rule 
makes perfect sense, because the agent is not acting for its own sake but 
on behalf of the principal. Moreover, where an agent does claim a right to 
enforce the contract, general agency principles typically place the burden 
on the agent to show that the parties intended to give the agent rights 
under the contract and may demand proof by clear and convincing 
evidence.
180
 
 
 
 177. The facts are drawn from Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 2003); see also 
Christopher Driskill, Note, A Dangerous Doctrine: The Case Against Using Concerted-Misconduct 
Estoppel to Compel Arbitration, 60 ALA. L. REV. 443, 446 (2009) (describing a similar example). 
 178. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006) (“When an agent acting with 
actual or apparent authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, . . . the agent is not a 
party to the contract unless the agent and third party agree otherwise.”); id. at reporter’s note b (citing 
cases); 12 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 68, § 35:34 (“The agent cannot enforce the contract, nor is 
he bound by it.”) (footnote omitted); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 285 (2002) (noting that a contract signed 
by an agent “generally does not give rise to any contractual obligation running to the agent”). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 cmt. d(1). To be sure, an agent who is sued can 
raise all the same defenses that a principal can raise, which presumably would include the defense that 
the dispute must be submitted to arbitration. See 12 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 68, § 35:53. The 
right of the agent to raise defenses, however, presupposes that the agent is a party to or is otherwise 
bound by the contract. If the agent is not a party to the contract, then the contract cannot be enforced 
against the agent at all, and the agent has no need to raise any defenses. In other words, only when an 
agent is a party to the contract can the agent raise defenses that the principal can raise. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 cmt. e (“In an action against an agent who is a party to a 
contract, the agent may assert all defenses that arise out of the contract itself and all defenses that are 
personal to the agent.”) (emphasis added).  
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 reporter’s note d(1). 
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In short, agency law looks to party intent in determining the agent’s 
rights. Because an agent acts on behalf of the principal rather than for 
herself, agency principles assume that the parties did not intend for the 
agent to have rights under the contract unless there is clear evidence to the 
contrary.  
In the arbitration context, however, courts have given short shrift to the 
signatory parties’ collective intent and have given employees, 
salespersons, debt collectors, and other agents broad rights to compel 
arbitration, even though they are not signatories to the agreement.
181
 The 
prevailing view is that there is a presumption that an arbitration clause 
requires a party to arbitrate not just against a signatory but also against 
non-signatory agents with whom no arbitration agreement was ever 
reached.
182
 This presumption sounds very similar to Moses H. Cone’s 
presumption favoring arbitration. In fact, courts have explicitly relied on 
the federal policy favoring arbitration in giving non-signatory agents the 
right to force a plaintiff into arbitration.
183
  
At first blush, this view of contractual intent may seem persuasive. But 
as discussed already, giving agents unfettered rights to force a dispute into 
 
 
 181. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Courts in this and 
other circuits consistently have held that employees or disclosed agents of an entity that is a party to an 
arbitration agreement are protected by that agreement.”); Arnold v. Arnold Corp.–Printed Commc’ns 
for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1282 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that agents and employees were protected by 
the arbitration agreement signed by their principal); Messing v. Rosenkrantz, 872 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995) (holding that an agent can enforce or be bound by an arbitration clause signed by its 
principal); Monsanto Co. v. Benton Farm, 813 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250 
(Ala. 1996) (finding that a salesperson can enforce an arbitration agreement entered into by the 
dealership employing the salesperson); In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. 
2007) (permitting admissions officers to compel arbitration of students’ claim of fraudulent 
inducement to enroll at a college because the officers were agents of the college and could enforce the 
arbitration clause between the students and the college); Ayala v. Cont’l Servs., 146 Wash. App. 1046 
(2008) (allowing employees and supervisors to enforce an arbitration clause signed by the employer).   
 182. See, e.g., Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[B]road 
arbitration provisions [are] intended to obligate signatories to the agreement to arbitrate disputes 
brought not only against the principal, but claims made against the principal’s agents.”); In re Vesta 
Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (“When contracting parties agree to arbitrate all 
disputes ‘under or with respect to’ a contract (as they did here), they generally intend to include 
disputes about their agents’ actions . . . .”) (citing Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 
1995)).  
 183. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“In keeping with the federal policy favoring arbitration, we . . . will extend the scope of the 
arbitration clauses to agents of the party who signed the agreements.”); Arnold, 920 F.2d at 1281 
(agreeing with other federal courts that a rule allowing agents to enforce arbitration clauses “is an 
outgrowth of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration”); Letizia v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 
802 F.2d 1185, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1986); see also In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 
(Tex. 2007) (reasoning that allowing non-signatory agents to enforce arbitration clauses is necessary to 
“place such clauses on an equal footing with all other parts of a corporate contract”). 
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arbitration, even though there was no agreement to arbitrate between the 
plaintiff and the agent, does not comport with traditional contract and 
agency rules.
184
 The judicial presumption that arbitration clauses are 
intended to cover agents stands in direct contrast to the general agency 
presumption that parties do not intend for agents to have contractual rights 
unless the agent can rebut that presumption with clear and convincing 
evidence.
185
 Thus, while courts like to think that allowing agents to 
enforce arbitration clauses is necessary to fulfill the FAA’s mandate of 
“plac[ing] such clauses on an equal footing with all other parts of a 
corporate contract,”186 such a rule in fact treats arbitration clauses more 
favorably than other contract provisions. 
The mistake that courts have made is to focus only on the intent of the 
party employing the agent rather than on the intent of both parties. The 
reasoning that all agents, which may include a company’s entire 
workforce, can enforce the arbitration clause because that is what the 
company intended, is problematic. What matters is what both parties 
intended. It is far from clear that an individual signing an arbitration clause 
with a company intended to waive his or her judicial rights not only 
 
 
 184. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 185. To be sure, not all courts have categorically permitted agents to enforce arbitration clauses 
signed on behalf of principals. A few courts have followed traditional common-law principles and 
have refused to afford such rights to agents absent a clear indication that the contract was intended to 
give agents the right to enforce the arbitration clause. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 
462, 466 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] nonsignatory cannot compel arbitration merely because he is an agent 
of one of the signatories.”); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 357 (1st Cir. 1994) (suggesting that 
employees can enforce an arbitration clause signed by an employer only when the contractual 
language demonstrates an intent to benefit both the employer and employee alike); Britton v. Co-op 
Banking Grp., 4 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1993) (agent was not entitled to enforce arbitration clause); Housh 
v. Dinovo Invs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-2562-KHV, 2003 WL 1119526, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 7, 2003) 
(employee could not enforce arbitration clause signed by employer); Usina Costa Pinto S.A. Acucar e 
Alcool v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Co., 933 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Koechli v. BIP Int’l, 
Inc., 870 So. 2d 940, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Constantino v. Frechette, 897 N.E.2d 1262, 1266–
67 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (employees of nursing home could not enforce arbitration clause signed by 
nursing home when the agreement expressed no intent to cover the employees); I Sports v. IMG 
Worldwide, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 4, 11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). However, these cases appear to be a 
minority, and some have been contradicted by other cases within the same jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., 
Westmoreland, 299 F.3d at 466 (concluding “that a nonsignatory cannot compel arbitration merely 
because he is an agent of one of the signatories,”), with DK Joint Venture 1 v. Weyand, 649 F.3d 310, 
314–17 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that agents are not ordinarily bound by arbitration clauses even 
though they may be able to enforce such clauses against a signatory); compare Koechli, 870 So. 2d at 
944 (“We reject the broad construction of the agency exception urged by appellants, which would 
permit a non-signatory agent to a signatory to invoke arbitration simply because the agency 
relationship exists.”), with Qubty, 817 So. 2d at 958 (allowing non-signatory agent to enforce 
arbitration agreement); compare Britton, 4 F.3d at 742 (refusing to allow non-signatory agent to 
enforce arbitration clause), with Letizia, 802 F.2d at 1187–88 (finding that the arbitration clause 
covered non-signatory agents). 
 186. In re Merrill Lynch, 235 S.W.3d at 189. 
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against the company, but also against every single employee and agent of 
the company.
187
 The singular focus on the intent of the party drafting and 
seeking to benefit from the arbitration clause highlights just how strongly 
Moses H. Cone’s dicta regarding the presumption in favor of arbitration 
informs the courts’ reasoning, even when courts purport to apply general 
rules of contract law. 
Second, such a rule becomes even more difficult to justify under 
traditional contract and agency law when the underlying dispute involves a 
tort or statutory violation rather than a breach of contract. While agents 
have no obligation under the contract, they are still answerable for any 
torts that they commit against a contracting party because tort obligations 
are based in law and not in the contract.
188
 In other words, an agent’s 
rights and duties are completely independent of the contract, and in light 
of that framework, the agent has no standing to rely on the contract to 
force an opposing party out of court and into arbitration.  
Third, giving agents rights under the contract simply because of their 
status as agents may lead to anomalous results. Unless courts intend to 
explicitly create special rules for arbitration clauses, if an agent is subject 
to the arbitration clause of a contract, then the agent presumably is subject 
to the other provisions of the contract as well. But it seems unlikely that 
courts would be willing to allow plaintiffs who sign contracts with 
corporations to sue not just the corporation, but also any of its employees, 
for every breach. If an employer fails to pay an employee for example, it is 
doubtful that the employee can sue all other employees of the company in 
addition to the company itself. Moreover, if an agent can enforce the 
arbitration clause, then presumably it would be bound by the arbitration 
clause as well and could be required to arbitrate a dispute brought against 
it even though the agent did not sign the arbitration agreement. However, 
courts have been much more reluctant to bind an agent to an arbitration 
clause than to allow the agent to enforce the arbitration clause.
189
 That 
 
 
 187. See, e.g., Constantino, 897 N.E.2d at 1266 (refusing to allow non-signatory employees of a 
nursing home to enforce an arbitration clause where the plaintiff “could not reasonably have 
understood that she was agreeing to waive her right to a jury trial not only against the nursing home, 
but also against all its employees”). 
 188. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 
(2002) (“Generally, agency law does not insulate an agent from liability for his or her own torts, 
because an agent’s tort liability is not based upon the contractual relationship between the principal 
and agent . . . . ”) (footnote omitted). 
 189. See, e.g., DK Joint Venture 1, 649 F.3d at 314–17 (explaining that agents are not ordinarily 
bound by arbitration clauses even though they may be able to enforce such clauses against a 
signatory); see also McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 361 (refusing to allow an agent to enforce arbitration clause 
because “[i]n appellant’s scenario, then, the agent, though he could not be compelled to arbitrate, 
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discomfort with binding agents to a contract and hence to the contract’s 
arbitration clause merely reinforces how a rule allowing agents to enforce 
arbitration clauses gives arbitration clauses special status and deviates 
from standard common-law principles.  
This does not mean that non-signatory agents should never be able to 
enforce arbitration clauses. Instead, it means that courts are using the 
wrong doctrine in analyzing such cases. In many ways, agency theory is 
ill-suited for addressing whether a plaintiff is required to arbitrate lawsuits 
filed against non-party agents for their own illegal conduct. The discussion 
of agency theory presumes a situation where an agent negotiates a contract 
on behalf of the principal and then the question arises whether the 
negotiating agent is bound by that contract.
190
 But many agency cases may 
involve misconduct by employees, debt collectors, or other agents who 
played no role in drafting or negotiating the agreement and whose agency 
role for the company arises in an entirely different capacity.
191
 
The doctrine that seems most applicable to lawsuits brought against 
non-signatory agents and employees is not agency but third-party 
beneficiary. That is because in agency cases, courts often focus on whether 
the arbitration agreement was intended to cover agents as well as 
principals.
192
 That language of intent speaks directly to third-party 
beneficiary doctrine. Under that doctrine, a non-signatory is a third-party 
beneficiary with rights to enforce the contract where the signing parties 
intend to confer a benefit on the non-signatory, such as where a party 
contracts to perform a service but directs that payment be provided to a 
third party.
193
 The crucial inquiry is intent.
194
 Only intended beneficiaries 
 
 
nonetheless could compel the claimant to submit to arbitration”); Flink v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 44, 46 
(8th Cir. 1988) (“Signing an arbitration agreement as agent for a disclosed principal is not sufficient to 
bind the agent to arbitrate claims against him personally.”); Riley v. Ennis, Docket No. 290510, 2010 
WL 673369, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement in lawsuit 
against signatory’s agent).  
 190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006) (discussing the obligations of 
“an agent . . . [who] makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal”). 
 191. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 182; see also Letizia v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 802 
F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the employer “has clearly indicated its intention to 
protect its employees” by including an arbitration clause in its customer agreement and therefore a 
non-signatory employee could enforce the arbitration clause); BLAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 7.4.4 at 
255–58 (describing third-party beneficiary doctrine as the proper framework rather than agency law). 
 193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).  
 194. See id.; 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 44.1 (rev. ed. 2007); accord R.J. 
Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass’n, 384 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a 
third party may enforce a contract “if the contracting parties intended to create a direct, rather than an 
incidental or consequential, benefit to such third person”) (quoting Goode v. St. Stephens United 
Methodist Church, 494 S.E.2d 827, 833 (S.C. 1997)); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
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have rights under the contract; incidental beneficiaries do not.
195
 Thus, in 
addressing attempts by agents to enforce arbitration clauses, courts should 
apply third-party beneficiary principles rather than the special agency 
principles that they have created to allow agents to compel arbitration. 
Although it may seem academic to argue that courts should switch 
from an agency-based doctrine to a third-party beneficiary doctrine, there 
are significant differences between the two, at least as courts have applied 
them to arbitration provisions. Whereas courts have operated under a 
default presumption that agents and employees can enforce arbitration 
clauses, even if they are not explicitly named in the agreement, unless the 
arbitration clause specifically excludes them, third-party beneficiary 
doctrine works the opposite way. There, the presumption is that a 
non-signatory is not an intended beneficiary of the contract, and the 
burden is on the non-signatory to present evidence of beneficiary status.
196
 
Moreover, the fact that the contract or the arbitration clause fails to 
mention the non-signatory often is sufficient on its own to defeat any 
claim to third-party beneficiary status.
197
 As a result, there are many 
situations where a non-signatory will qualify as an agent, but not as a 
third-party beneficiary.
198
 Thus, applying the correct contractual doctrine, 
 
 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Under the third 
party beneficiary theory, a court must look to the intentions of the parties at the time the contract was 
executed.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Mo. 2006) (En Banc) (“To be 
bound as a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit that 
party or an identifiable class of which the party is a member. In cases where the contract lacks an 
express declaration of that intent, there is a strong presumption that the third party is not a beneficiary 
and that the parties contracted to benefit only themselves. Furthermore, a mere incidental benefit to the 
third party is insufficient to bind that party.”) (citations omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. a. 
 196. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994); 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.3 (1990).  
 197. See, e.g., Brantley v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 392, 396–97 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that a mortgage insurer was not a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the consumer and the 
mortgage lender because the contract made no reference to the insurer or otherwise evinced any intent 
by the parties to benefit the insurer); Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 362 (5th Cir. 
2003) (finding that a failure to identify the beneficiary in the contract showed that it was not a 
third-party beneficiary); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 146 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
arbitration clause limited to explicitly defined “Buyer” and “Seller” did not evince an intent to benefit 
other parties because “the law requires ‘special clarity’ to support a finding ‘that the contracting parties 
intended to confer a benefit’ on a third party”) (citing McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 362).  
 198. See, e.g., McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 362 (finding that non-signatory seeking to enforce arbitration 
clause was an agent of the signatory, but not a third-party beneficiary); Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 
4 F.3d 742, 745–48 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (“Qubty concedes that the contract involved here does not designate him to be a third party 
beneficiary of the contract. He nonetheless contends he has a right to enforce the arbitration agreement 
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rather than creating special agency doctrines in the arbitration context, will 
have a significant effect on the ability of third parties to enforce arbitration 
provisions.  
To be sure, some courts have reasoned that limiting an agent’s right to 
enforce an arbitration clause is improper (a) because entities can act only 
through their agents,
199
 and (b) because it will allow plaintiffs to 
circumvent arbitration clauses by suing non-signatory agents instead of the 
signatory corporation.
200
 These concerns, however, are overblown. First, 
applying third-party beneficiary doctrine instead of the current agency 
doctrine does not eliminate a non-signatory’s ability to enforce the 
arbitration clause. It merely establishes that the non-signatory will not be 
able to enforce it in the absence of clear evidence showing that the parties 
intended to give enforcement powers to non-signatories. If an entity 
utilizing an arbitration clause wishes to protect its employees and agents, 
all it needs to do is to draft the arbitration clause to include them as well. 
While some courts have suggested that it is too cumbersome to require 
drafting parties to spell out all the employees and agents that can enforce 
the clause,
201
 there is no reason why this is the case.
202
 Plenty of contracts 
spell out the intended third-party beneficiaries, and if third-party 
beneficiary doctrine can function effectively for other contractual 
provisions, there is no reason to think it cannot function effectively for 
arbitration clauses as well. Indeed, it seems only fair to require the parties 
to spell out the intended beneficiaries in the contract. A party that is giving 
up its right to go to court is entitled to know with whom it will be required 
to arbitrate rather than finding out only after a dispute arises.  
Second, suing a non-signatory agent instead of the signatory principal 
carries its own set of risks. If the plaintiff sues on a contract claim, then 
the claim will fail if the agent is the only defendant because the agent is 
 
 
under principles of agency. We agree.”); Constantino v. Frechette, 897 N.E.2d 1262, 1265–68 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2008). 
 199. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. 2007). 
 200. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e believe that 
the parties fully intended to protect the individual Chairs to the extent they are charged with 
misconduct within the scope of the agreements. If it were otherwise, it would be too easy to 
circumvent the agreements by naming individuals as defendants instead of the entity Agents 
themselves.”). 
 201. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, 235 S.W.3d at 189. 
 202. In fact, many arbitration clauses specifically identify employees or agents as intended 
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Hoefs v. CACV of Colo., LLC, 365, F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(arbitration clause stated that it applied to “[a]ny claim or dispute (‘Claim’) by either you or us against 
the other, or against employees, agents, or assigns of the other”); Jones v. Jacobson, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
522, 536–37 (Ct. App. 2011) (noting that the language of the arbitration clause stated that the clause 
“shall also apply to any such controversy involving any agent or employee of yours”). 
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not a party to the contract. For other claims, an agent may not be as 
wealthy as a principal and may not be able to pay the full judgment. If the 
principal is not a party, then the plaintiff cannot recover under a 
respondeat superior theory either.
203
 For these reasons, most tort plaintiffs 
choose to sue the principal rather than the agent alone.
204
  
Third, companies may intentionally choose not to include agents and 
employees within the purview of the arbitration clause because they may 
not want them to be bound by the arbitration clause. If employees wish to 
avoid being bound by an arbitration clause, they, as a matter of fairness, 
also should not be permitted to enforce the clause.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the concern that allowing a 
plaintiff to unfairly escape its obligation to arbitrate by suing 
non-signatory agents presumes the answer to the question of what 
disputes, and against whom, the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate. The fact that a 
plaintiff has agreed to arbitrate a certain type of dispute against one party 
does not mean that the plaintiff has agreed to arbitrate that dispute against 
all possible parties. Rather, that plaintiff has only agreed to arbitrate 
disputes against other signatories, absent any express indication in the 
contract to apply the arbitration clause to agents or other non-signatories. 
In fact, it is quite common to have a lawsuit against both signatory and 
non-signatory parties where all the claims arise out of the same contract or 
the same set of facts. Moses H. Cone was such a case.
205
 In these 
situations, the FAA does not require the plaintiff to arbitrate all claims 
against all parties, signatories and non-signatories alike, simply because 
the claims arise out of the same facts. Instead, courts can require 
arbitration of the claims against the signatory, but they have no authority 
to require arbitration of the claims against the non-signatory. Courts 
simply retain discretion either to stay the non-arbitrable claims until the 
conclusion of the arbitration or to allow both sets of cases to proceed in 
tandem.
206
 By presuming that a plaintiff who sues non-signatory agents is 
 
 
 203. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the torts of its employees 
committed within the scope of employment. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (2000) 
(defining respondeat superior). 
 204. See, e.g., 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1 (Aspen 3d ed. 2008) 
(“[I]n the vast majority of cases the plaintiff seeks satisfaction from the employer alone.”). 
 205. In that case, the Hospital had two substantive disputes—one with Mercury, which was a 
party to the arbitration clause, and one with the Architect that could not be sent to arbitration because 
there was no agreement to arbitrate between the Hospital and the Architect. Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1983). 
 206. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20 n.23 (stating that the decision whether to stay resolution 
of the non-arbitrable claims or to allow them to proceed “is one left to the district court (or to the state 
trial court under applicable state procedural rules) as a matter of its discretion to control its docket”). 
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avoiding its obligation to arbitrate, courts are begging the question of with 
whom the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate. 
In short, courts have used the federal policy favoring arbitration to 
deviate from traditional common-law principles and give agents and 
employees a presumptive right to enforce arbitration clauses that they 
never signed. As a result, courts are requiring individuals to arbitrate 
disputes against parties with whom they never agreed to arbitrate. In doing 
so, courts are improperly denying those parties their day in court and also 
undermining the basic purpose of the FAA to make arbitration agreements 
just like other contracts. 
2. Equitable Estoppel 
Another way in which courts have improperly expanded the federal 
policy favoring arbitration to give non-signatories broader rights to 
enforce arbitration clauses than other contract provisions is through the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Many courts have interpreted the doctrine 
so broadly as to give non-signatories virtually the exact same rights under 
the contract as a signatory, and have omitted basic limitations on the 
breadth of estoppel, such as the requirements of misrepresentation and 
detrimental reliance.  
The basic purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent a party from 
taking unfair advantage of another party by inducing that party to rely on 
the contract and then later seeking to avoid the contract’s burdens. 
Equitable estoppel generally is defined as “a defensive doctrine preventing 
one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false 
language or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person 
to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been 
injured in some way.”207 As the definition shows, equitable estoppel 
requires (1) inconsistent or false statements that (2) induce detrimental 
reliance—i.e., causing an opposing party to act to his or her detriment 
based on a statement that is false or that the party later disavows. 
Detrimental reliance is widely described in treatises and in case law as a 
critical and defining feature of equitable estoppel.
208
 Such a requirement 
 
 
 207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (9th ed. 2009); see also T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of 
Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 388 (2008) (describing the 
contours of equitable estoppel). 
 208. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 935 (1986) (“An essential element of any estoppel is 
detrimental reliance on the adverse party’s misrepresentations . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 894 (1979); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 74 (West 2014) (“A requisite element of 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that the party invoking it must show that he or she relied on the 
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makes sense, since a primary purpose of estoppel is to prevent parties from 
taking advantage of others through false and inconsistent statements. If the 
opposing party has not relied on the false or misleading statement, then 
that party has not been unfairly disadvantaged.  
The stated purpose of equitable estoppel in arbitration is similar: to 
prevent a party who sues to recover on a claim that relates to the contract 
containing the arbitration clause from avoiding the contract’s burdens, 
namely, compelled arbitration.
209
 The theory is that by suing 
non-signatories instead of signatories, the plaintiff is trying to have it both 
ways by relying on the contract to make a claim, while disavowing the 
contract’s arbitration clause at the same time.  
With this concern in mind, courts have permitted non-signatories to 
enforce arbitration clauses under an equitable estoppel theory in two 
situations: (1) where the claims—whether sounding in contract, tort, or 
statute—are sufficiently intertwined with the contract containing the 
arbitration clause; or (2) where the signatory brings claims that allege 
“substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” between a 
non-signatory and a signatory.
210
 Not surprisingly, in developing the 
arbitration version of the equitable estoppel doctrine, courts have relied on 
the federal policy favoring arbitration, concluding that if a signatory were 
allowed to avoid arbitration by naming non-signatories, “the federal policy 
in favor of arbitration [would be] effectively thwarted.”211  
 
 
other party’s conduct to his or her detriment or prejudice.”); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 113 
(2008) (describing “detrimental reliance on another’s misrepresentations” as “an essential element of 
estoppel”). But cf. Anenson, supra note 207, at 388–98 (stating that some courts have moved away 
from strictly requiring detrimental reliance for various forms of estoppel without speaking to equitable 
estoppel directly). 
 209. See, e.g., R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass’n, 384 F.3d 157, 160–61 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“In the context of arbitration, the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] applies when one party 
attempts to hold another party to the terms of an agreement while simultaneously trying to avoid the 
agreement's arbitration clause.”) (quotation marks and punctuation omitted); MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. 
Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999) (warning that a signatory should not be permitted to have 
it both ways). 
 210. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting MS 
Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th. Cir.1999)) (quotation marks omitted); CD 
Partners, LLC v. Grizzle, 424 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 211. Sam Reisfeld & Son Imp. Co. v. S. A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976); accord Int’l 
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (“To 
allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens would both 
disregard equity and contravene the purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act.”) (citing 
Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J. of Cal., 426 F. Supp. 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)); Franklin, 177 F.3d at 
947. 
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Equitable estoppel comes up often in arbitration cases
212
 and “is the 
most common argument used by non-parties as the basis for enforcing an 
arbitration provision.”213 Part of the reason is that courts have made it 
much easier to apply equitable estoppel with respect to arbitration clauses 
than with respect to other contractual provisions. The expansion of 
equitable estoppel in the arbitration context beyond the doctrine’s 
traditional parameters has occurred in several ways. 
First, the hallmark element of traditional equitable estoppel—
detrimental reliance—is not a relevant consideration in the arbitration 
context.
214
 Instead of focusing on whether the opposing party suffers 
detriment, the arbitration version of equitable estoppel looks solely at the 
actions of the signing party—namely whether that party is seeking to 
benefit from the contract while at the same time trying to unfairly avoid 
the contract’s arbitration clause.215 Most cases applying equitable estoppel 
do not discuss (let alone require) detrimental reliance at all.
216
 The shift 
away from detrimental reliance and toward focusing solely on whether the 
signing party made an inconsistent or false statement likely derives in part 
from the federal policy favoring arbitration. Courts appear to have 
concluded that allowing a signatory to an arbitration agreement to bring a 
dispute in court against a non-signatory would undermine the federal 
policy, even if the non-signatory suffers no harm.
217
 
 
 
 212. See, e.g., Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts have 
frequently stayed proceedings and compelled arbitration under the FAA on equitable estoppel 
grounds.”); James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International 
Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
469, 489 (2004) (describing equitable estoppel as “a doctrine frequently invoked in commercial 
arbitration”).  
 213. Richard M. Alderman, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Meets Arbitration: 
Non-parties and Arbitration, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 586, 596 (2012). 
 214. Only a small minority of jurisdictions appear to require detrimental reliance in the arbitration 
context. See, e.g., Peach v. CIM Ins. Corp., 816 N.E.2d 668, 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that 
detrimental reliance is an element of equitable estoppel); B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. Wedgeworth, 
911 So. 2d 483, 492 (Miss. 2005) (same); Angrisani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P., 952 A.2d 1140, 1148 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (same); see also Donaldson Co. v. Burroughs Diesel, Inc., 581 F.3d 
726 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that Mississippi law requires detrimental reliance for equitable estoppel to 
apply, unless there is substantial and concerted misconduct between a signatory and a non-signatory). 
 215. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 216. See LaForge, supra note 90, at 246–51 (arguing that courts have eliminated or “radically 
transform[ed]” the reliance requirement for equitable estoppel in the arbitration context); Nima H. 
Mohebbi, Comment, Back Door Arbitration: Why Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize 
Arbitration Clauses May Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 555, 571–76 (2010) 
(arguing that courts have not required detrimental reliance for equitable estoppel in arbitration). 
 217. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. In addition, some courts have acknowledged that 
while state law generally requires detrimental reliance, the federal policy favoring arbitration overrides 
the reliance requirement. See, e.g., Pearson v. Hilton Head Hosp., 733 S.E.2d 597, 601 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that “the federal substantive law of arbitratbility,” which includes the “liberal federal 
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The result has been to greatly expand the reach and applicability of 
equitable estoppel so that it can apply almost any time a party to an 
arbitration clause sues a non-signatory. “Without reliance, estoppel 
extends to an infinite variety of situations because its operation no longer 
depends on a prior relationship between the parties to the lawsuit.”218 If all 
that matters is whether the signatory’s suit against the non-signatory is 
seen as inconsistent with its decision to sign a contract with an arbitration 
clause, then equitable estoppel can apply in almost all non-signatory 
situations. This expansion is significant because detrimental reliance is 
unlikely to arise in many arbitration cases. Most non-signatories to a 
contract with an arbitration clause, such as an employee of a signatory 
company or a sub-contractor of a signatory contractor, have little or no 
knowledge of the terms of the contract between the signatory parties, let 
alone whether there is an arbitration clause and what disputes that clause 
covers. Moreover, even if a non-signatory party is aware of the arbitration 
clause, it will not always be the case that the party relied on that 
knowledge. In the prior example of a salesperson making a false 
representation about the quality of an automobile,
219
 it is unlikely that the 
salesperson’s willingness to make false statements was induced by the 
presence of the arbitration provision—i.e. that in the absence of the 
arbitration provision, the salesperson would have given truthful 
information.  
Even if there were reliance by a non-signatory party, it is not clear that 
the reliance would be reasonable. General principles of equitable estoppel 
require not just reliance, but reasonable reliance, by the non-signatory.
220
 It 
would not necessarily be reasonable for a non-signatory to assume that an 
arbitration clause in a contract between two parties would cover 
non-signatories in the absence of express language indicating intent to 
cover them. Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s emphasis that arbitration 
“is a matter of consent, not coercion,”221 it would seem unreasonable for a 
 
 
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” determines whether equitable estoppel applies). Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that state law determines if and when a 
non-signatory can enforce an arbitration agreement. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 
632 (2009) (“[A] litigant who was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if 
the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement.”). 
 218. Anenson, supra note 207, at 390. 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
 220. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 74 (stating that for estoppel to occur, the estopped 
party must “induce reasonable reliance by the other party”); Anenson, supra note 207, at 389 (noting 
that “some courts specify that the reliance be reasonable under the circumstances”). 
 221. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
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third party to try to rely on an arbitration provision that it never signed. 
Yet, courts appear to seldom check for reasonable reliance before finding 
that a party is required to give up its right to go to court on grounds of 
equitable estoppel. 
The effect of giving arbitration clauses special status in the estoppel 
context is especially evident when equitable estoppel is examined 
alongside the waiver doctrine discussed previously.
222
 It is notable that in 
the waiver context, courts have superimposed a reliance requirement in 
order to make it more difficult for a party to lose the ability to send a 
dispute to arbitration. By contrast, with respect to equitable estoppel, 
courts have largely eliminated the reliance requirement so as to make it 
easier for non-signatories to gain the right to compel arbitration. In other 
words, courts have simply manipulated the element of reliance to require it 
when doing so promotes arbitration and to take it away when it would 
impede arbitration.  
Second, some courts have expanded the scope of equitable estoppel in 
arbitration so far as to blur the distinction between a signatory and a 
non-signatory. As currently interpreted, equitable estoppel allows a 
non-signatory to enforce an arbitration clause in almost any circumstance 
that a signatory can enforce it. Given the default presumption that 
arbitration agreements bind only the parties that sign them, the blending of 
signatory and non-signatory rights suggests that equitable estoppel has 
grown beyond what general common-law principles permit. 
Courts have also broadly interpreted what constitutes inconsistent 
behavior by the signatory who signed the arbitration clause but is suing a 
non-signatory in court. The purpose of estoppel is to prevent a party from 
having it both ways by seeking to enforce the contract in order to obtain a 
remedy, but to avoid the contractual requirement of submitting disputes to 
arbitration. Thus, applying equitable estoppel might make sense where a 
signatory sues a non-signatory third party for breach of contract and 
claims that the third party is somehow bound by the contract. There, the 
signatory is trying to enforce the contract and at the same time bypass the 
contract’s arbitration provision. Consequently, the early cases involving 
equitable estoppel reflected a more conventional view of estoppel, as they 
speak in terms of plaintiffs seeking to enforce the contract or rely on its 
terms, or were cases where a plaintiff took what was essentially a contract 
claim and tried to recast it as a tort claim in order to avoid arbitration.
223
  
 
 
 222. See supra Part III.B. 
 223. See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(describing estoppel as applying when the signatory “must rely on the terms of the written agreement 
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The doctrine has subsequently grown, however, and is no longer 
limited to breach of contract claims or breach of contract claims that are 
dressed up as tort claims. Many courts have found that equitable estoppel 
requires arbitration of non-contract claims so long as the claims refer to 
the contract, are intertwined with the contract, or presume the contract’s 
existence.
224
 Although it may seem that courts are still tying estoppel back 
to the underlying contract, that language in practice turns out to have 
broad reach and really requires only that the claims relate to the contract in 
some way. As a result, the standard ends up being very similar to the 
standard used for determining whether claims against a signatory must be 
resolved in arbitration. A standard arbitration clause will cover any dispute 
that bears a “significant relationship” to the contract, “touches upon” the 
contract, or that has its genesis in the contract.
225
 Because many arbitration 
clauses are broadly written and interpreted liberally, only a dispute 
between signatories that is wholly unrelated to the contract will not be 
subject to arbitration.
226
 As a result, courts have conferred, through 
equitable estoppel, virtually the same rights to non-signatories as they 
have to signatories. This threatens to make equitable estoppel the 
exception that swallows the general rule that non-signatories cannot 
enforce arbitration provisions. Perhaps recognizing that such a broad 
application of estoppel would erase the distinction between signatories and 
non-signatories, courts have been more willing to find that claims against 
non-signatories are unrelated to the contract than similar claims brought 
by signatories.
227
 Nonetheless, the close similarity between signatories and 
non-signatories in their abilities to compel arbitration suggests that courts 
 
 
in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory”); McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. 
Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding estoppel applicable where the essence of the 
plaintiff’s claims was that the defendant breached its contractual duties and speculating that estoppel 
would not apply to unrelated tort claims); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark Cnty. Sch. Bldg. 
Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 838–39 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying estoppel after concluding that the plaintiff tried 
to artfully recast a contract claim as a tort claim). 
 224. See, e.g., CD Partners, LLC v. Grizzle, 424 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
equitable estoppel applied to tort claims of fraud and negligence against a non-signatory party because 
the claims “rely upon, refer to, and presume the existence of the written agreement between the two 
corporations”); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that equitable estoppel applied to plaintiff’s multiple tort claims, including fraud claims, 
because each claim “makes reference” to the licensing agreement containing the arbitration clause). 
 225. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 7.3.3 at 224–32. 
 226. See, e.g., Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 
1998) (finding that a doctor’s false advertising claim against a health maintenance organization 
(HMO) was not related to the contract between the doctor and the HMO covering the performance of 
medical services). 
 227. See, e.g., Hill v. GE Power Sys., Inc., 282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no estoppel 
where the plaintiff’s claim did not rely on the express terms of the agreement). 
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have overreached in interpreting and applying the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.  
Just as with the courts’ expansion of agency doctrine, the expansion of 
estoppel appears motivated by the belief that estoppel is necessary to 
prevent plaintiffs from having their cake and eating it too. That belief is 
misguided for the same reason that it is misguided in the agency 
context.
228
 If the party sues signatories and non-signatories, then courts 
can still require arbitration against the signatory and stay the 
non-arbitrable claims until the conclusion of the arbitration. Additionally, 
there is no reason why traditional equitable requirements, including 
detrimental reliance, are sufficient to protect fairness in other contexts but 
not in the arbitration context. Perhaps most importantly, the unfairness 
argument presumes that the signatory plaintiff is trying to hold the 
non-signatory to the terms of the contract. In those circumstances, where 
the plaintiff’s claim is essentially a breach of contract claim, equitable 
estoppel may well be applicable, assuming detrimental reliance. But tort 
claims, like fraud and fraudulent inducement, and statutory claims do not 
arise out of the contract. They are grounded in duties created in law. In 
those situations, the plaintiff is not trying to hold a defendant to the 
contract but is trying to hold the defendant accountable for its violations of 
legal duties. Simply put, the plaintiff is not trying to have it both ways.
229
  
 
 
 228. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text. 
 229. Another aspect of equitable estoppel that has received some criticism is the doctrine of 
“concerted misconduct” estoppel. Under this doctrine, a non-signatory can enforce or be bound by an 
arbitration clause where there is “concerted misconduct” between a signatory and a non-signatory. In 
other words, a non-signatory gets to obtain the benefits of the contract simply because its illegal 
activity is bound up with the illegal actions of a signatory. There appears to be no contract-law analog 
for rewarding a party that behaves illegally by granting the party rights under the contract. As a result, 
this prong of estoppel has been extensively criticized. See, e.g., J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, 
III, Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for Compelling Nonsignatories to Arbitrate—A Bridge Too Far?, 21 
REV. LITIG. 593 (2002); Driskill, supra note 180; Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and 
the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 711 (2007). Some courts have started to retreat from 
recognizing “concerted misconduct” estoppel. See, e.g., In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 
F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The plaintiff’s actual dependence on the underlying contract in 
making out the claim against the nonsignatory defendant is therefore always the sine qua non of an 
appropriate situation for applying equitable estoppel.”), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. PacifiCare 
Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 350–51 
(Mo. 2006) (rejecting argument for estoppel that claims against the non-signatory were inextricably 
intertwined with claims against the signatory as inconsistent with general contract principles); 
Angrisani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P., 952 A.2d 1140, 1149–50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 
(rejecting argument that estoppel applied because the non-signatory’s claims were inextricably 
intertwined with the signatory’s claims); In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. 
2007) (“But we have never compelled arbitration based solely on substantially interdependent and 
concerted misconduct, and for several reasons we decline to do so here.”); see also Ross v. Am. 
Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (limiting concerted misconduct estoppel to parties that 
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Due in no small part to the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, 
courts have created a “unique” doctrine of equitable estoppel as it applies 
to arbitration.
230
 Gone is the bedrock requirement of detrimental reliance, 
and courts instead have read the doctrine broadly so as to blur the 
distinction between signatories and non-signatories. Given the growth of 
estoppel doctrine into areas that spread far beyond the doctrine’s common 
law roots, it is no surprise that estoppel has become the most common way 
to force parties to arbitrate disputes against non-signatory parties with 
whom they never agreed to arbitrate.  
CONCLUSION 
Arbitration clauses are in millions of contracts that govern numerous 
relationships in individuals’ lives. Because of the far-reaching 
ramifications of forcing individuals to resolve disputes in arbitration rather 
than in court, it is important to ensure that arbitration clauses are properly 
interpreted. Unfortunately, current interpretation of the FAA has drifted 
away from the Act’s original goals. Thanks in part to the judiciary’s overly 
broad reading of the Supreme Court’s poorly-conceived description of a 
federal policy favoring arbitration, courts have moved away from treating 
arbitration clauses like other contracts. Instead, arbitration clauses have 
become “super contracts,” subject to special rules that ensure that they 
remain enforceable even when other contractual provisions are not. The 
result not only runs afoul of the original purpose of the FAA, but also 
unfairly deprives many litigants of their right to seek redress in a court of 
law.  
 
 
share a close corporate relationship, such as a parent and a subsidiary). The merits of “concerted 
misconduct” estoppel fall outside the scope of this Article. 
 230. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Equitable Estoppel to Compel 
Arbitration by or Against Nonsignatory—State Cases, 22 A.L.R. 6th 387, 387 (2007) (stating that 
courts have created “a unique body of ‘equitable estoppel’ law that is peculiarly applicable” to 
arbitration). 
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